Russia v. Ukraine: Causes and Consequences

What are the causes and consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

It seems pretty clear the causes of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine consist of a combination of ethnolinguistic divisions and security concerns, with some small historical factors thrown into the mix. I'm a big fan of maps as a means of understanding issues. Below is a map that I feel represents the ethnolinguistic situation fairly well:

Unsurprisingly, the areas annexed by Russia -- particularly Crimea -- are those areas with a Russian ethnic majority or significant minority and that are Russian-speaking. I wrote last week about the extent to which Putin's foreign policy has been irrendentist at least with regard to the protection, if not annexation, of Russians living outside Russia's borders.

Another map lays out why security concerns caused the conflict:

  

This map of the Rada election results in 2014 shows People's Front (pro-EU) voters in the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic areas and the opposition in the Russian areas. Therefore, for Russia, concerns about accession to the EU and further separation of Ukraine from Russia at the very least provided a pretense for intervention. Finally, it bears noting that the USSR had bestowed Crimea on Ukraine only in the 1950s, so an historical argument could be made that, in the case of the peninsula, a legitimate claim cwas being made by Russia.

In terms of the consequences, the most important one, I think, is the extent to which it has brought Putin and Russia into further conflict with the EU and United States. Hawks in the U.S. had already been gunning for Putin over his intervention in Georgia, but the Obama administration had sought a "Russian reset," at least during Obama's first term. However, the Ukrainian conflict turned the relationship overwhelmingly negative, giving rise to Russian-U.S. conflict the full extent of which we have yet to see.

The Medvedev Interregnum

6.1. What was the significance of the Medvedev interregnum?

I think the greatest significance of the Medvedev interregnum was that the period signaled to the world and the country itself that Russia would at least continue to give the outward appearance of democracy, even while ultimate political power continued to be wielded by Putin. For all of the ink (apparently) spilled in considering the extent to which consigning Putin to a term as prime minister as Medvedev ascended to the presidency would change the power dynamic, I don't think that the period was all that significant in terms of genuine changes implemented by Medvedev. Perhaps in making this assessment I am relying too much on knowing the outcome in the five years since Putin has returned to the presidency.

Here, Alexander Baturo and Slava Mikhaylov seem to have made a strong case for Medvedev at least believing for some of the period that he might be an independent actor from Putin in establishing his own policy initiatives. They emphasize his liberalization and modernization schemes, for example, although they note that he mainly enunciated these goals in speeches and writing rather than in concrete proposals. Thus, they conclude, Medvedev "could be regarded as neither a figurehead nor a fully-fledged successor."[1] Simultaneously, they note, Russian regional governors drifted more into Putin's orbit during Medvedev's presidency. Thus, in the end, Medvedev was more of a placeholder than perhaps he himself realized at the time.

What I'm left wondering is why Medvedev stayed on with Putin after the latter returned to the presidency. Ola Cichowlas wrote in March of this year that Medvedev had made himself a millionaire several times over via corruption as part of Putin's team, but he was increasingly being seen as a scapegoat for the government as economic misfortune has led to dissatisfaction among the population. "While Putin’s approval ratings have soared as a result of his efforts to play tough with the West and secure military victories abroad," Cichowlas writes, "Medvedev has taken the blame for falling living standards at home. For the past few years, the Russian public, and even some within Putin’s hard-line inner circle, have considered Medvedev both weak and dispensable."[2] Nevertheless, at this writing, Medvedev remains the prime minister. Perhaps he poses more of a danger to Putin's hold on power as a potentially popular figure than as the unpopular man he is today.

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[1] Alexander Baturo and Slava Mikhaylov, "Reading the Tea Leaves: Medvedev's Presidency Through Political Rhetoric of Federal and Sub-National Actors," Europe-Asia Studies, 66, no. 6 (2014): 974.
[2] Ola Cichowlas, "The Most Hated Man in Russia," Foreign Affairs, March 28, 2017,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/28/the-most-hated-man-in-russia-dmitry-medvedev-protests-putin/, accessed November 27, 2017