Did Germany Actually Win the War?

My post for this week is inspired by the following quotation, which I read only two days ago for the first time. It surprised me at first and then struck me as somewhat perceptive. Now, however, I see the authors as having emphasized Germany's "victory" too much:

In strategic terms Germany had won the Great War. Its industrial base remained intact; it lost little territory of value; it now fronted on one major power (a debilitated France) rather than three (France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia). Its industrial strength, its geographic position, and the size of its population gave it the greatest economic potential in Europe, while the small states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans were all open to German political and economic domination.[1]

The authors, Murray and Millett, go on to discuss the Dolchstoss (stab in the back) myth that emerged with the armistice and Versailles treaty, suggesting that the reality of the peace settlement was quite different from the myth that persisted into the 1920s.

Considering each of Murray and Millett's points, we can both determine the extent to which they are valid claims and include that points that they do not consider. First, the claim that Germany's "industrial base remained intact"[2] seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. While the Ruhr region remained under German sovereignty, the coal of the Saar region was ceded to France, leaving Germany without an important power source. Moreover, in losing urban regions in the east -- particularly those around Danzig -- other important industrial bases were lost. Thus, while the most important industrial region was intact, there were important losses, and these losses were made more severe by the reparations regime imposed on Germany under the Versailles treaty. It is somewhat unfair to consider this lost territory as lacking value.

Second, it is true that Germany how had only one major power on its frontiers, rather than three. Austria-Hungary had been an ally, so its dissolution actually might have been considered more of a threat were it not for the inherent weakness of the successor states that emerged. France, which already had a smaller population that Germany, had now an even smaller population due to combat losses. Most importantly, there was now a cordon sanitaire separating Russia and Germany, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Any assault on Germany from the east would afford quite a bit of warning for Germany going forward, which was a major defense advantage.

Third, while the economic potential for Germany certainly existed after World War I, as noted above, the reparations regime and, more importantly, the means by which Germany sought to fulfill its obligations -- specifically the printing of money, resulting in hyperinflation -- had catastrophic effects for Germany during the 1920s until implementation of the Dawes Plan to stabilize Germany's currency. As a result, any real economic potential of Germany was gravely compromised by the terms of the peace.

Finally, there is the question of a sphere of influence for Germany among the new states in central and eastern Europe. This seems to have been largely true in 1919, although with the emergence of fascist Italy in 1922 as a regional power, this potential for Germany to establish a sphere of influence was somewhat diluted. Moreover, the terms of the Versailles treaty and subsequent League of Nations resolutions prevented Germany from pressing its hard to heavily in the region. For example, while ethnicity and internal Austrian political trends dictated that Germany's influence would be strong in the new Republic of Austria, attempts at political union were squelched and even economic cooperation was frowned upon as an attempt at German expansion.[3]

Therefore, I think it's safe to conclude that, while Germany was successful in maintaining its continued existence, its ability to preserve itself was compromised. That said, considering the alternatives that could have been foisted upon Germany, including its complete dissolution -- it was, after all, less than 50 years old as a state -- it was at least technically preserved, although the extent to which such a state could persist in the long term given the crippling reparations imposed on it is questionable.

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     [1] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2001), 3.
     [2] Ibid.
     [3] Steve Beller, A Concise History of Austria (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007): 197-230.

Political Destabilization in WWI Germany

It is axiomatic that World War I had tremendous impacts on Germany, and these effects were political, economic, and social. These effects were, to a very large extent, interrelated, since economic causes often underpin political and social changes. However, in terms of the long-term effects of the changes wrought by Germany's involved in WWI, I believe the political changes were the most important.

In his book, Michael Howard notes that tension arose in the last two years of the war between the High Command, which attained control over the German economy in 1917 to assure full economic mobilization, and the Reichstag, i.e., the popularly elected legislature, which controlled government spending.[1] The most popular political party in Germany was the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which had finished first in election in Germany since its legalization in 1890, but it had been prevented from holding political power on the basis of Germany's constitution not guaranteeing proportional representation. A combination of factors in early 1917, including the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war, caused a split in the SPD on the basis of ongoing support for the war.[2] While the newly formed United SPD opposed the war on principle, the remaining SPD sought to turn the situation with the High Command to its advantage by asking Chancellor Bethmann for democratic reforms. Instead, Theobald von Bethmann was pushed out of the Chancellery in favor of Georg Michaelis, who supported the High Command's position and helped them to consolidate their power under the Banner of the Fatherland Party.[3]

On short order in 1918 came the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia and the March offensive in the west by General Ludendorff. When it ultimately failed, the High Command appealed to U.S. President Wilson for peace on the basis of the latter's Fourteen Points. Michaelis was replaced by Prince Max of Baden, who immediately sued for peace. In this environment, the SPD was able to push their earlier democratic reforms, including proportional representation, through successfully, with an SPD member, Philipp Scheidemann, even entering the cabinet in the fall as the de facto Foreign Minister.[4] The long-brewing mutiny in the military begin in Kiel on November 4, the Kaiser fled the country on November 8, and the following day, Scheidemann proclaimed Germany to be a republic. The new government was dominated by the SPD and signed the armistice ending the war on November 11, with the new Chancellor Friedrich Ebert telling the press that the revolution was over.[5]

Thus, Ludendorff's offensive in early 1918 can be seen as a last-ditch attempt by the High Command to prevent the inevitable -- a truly democratic government led by the SPD that would make peace without annexations, proving that the whole effort of the war had been for naught. The High Command's actions thereafter provide further proof of the nature of the offensive. Of course, the new SPD-led government would lay the groundwork for future disaster, not only in signing and then continuing to defend the humiliating Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 -- which would come to be known as the "stab in the back" to which Hitler would often refer -- but also in empowering the right-wing Freikorps militias in using them to put down the Bolshevik-inspired rebellions that occurred in the same year. As historian David Blackbourn has written, however, the SPD did manage to institute several important social reforms, as well as prevent right-wing authoritarian takeovers like that in Hungary, which experienced similar left-wing revolutionary activity.[6] To that extent, although the fight against authoritarianism ultimately failed in Germany, it was successful in the short term owing to the efforts of the SPD.

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     [1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 1584, Amazon Kindle.
     [2] David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 486.
     [3] Ibid, 487-89.
     [4] Ibid, 491.
     [5] Ibid, 492.
     [6] Ibid, 493.

Armistice: Wilson vs Pershing

In a country like the United States, where the Constitution states that the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces but that person is by definition a civilian, conflicts can arise between members of the military and the President. The disagreement between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas Macarthur during the Korean War is probably the most famous. A less known dispute emerged between President Woodrow Wilson and General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, over the issue of whether to grant an armistice to Germany. Ultimately, the harsh terms of the armistice dictated by the Allies demonstrate the resolution of this conflict.

In October 1918, the Germans approached President Wilson to negotiate an armistice based on the latter's Fourteen Points. Three weeks later, at Senlis in northern France, General Pershing attended a meeting where the terms of the armistice were discussed. At that meeting, Pershing expressed the opinion that the terms of any armistice should render unable to fight again should the armistice fail. These terms included, among others, the vacation of occupied territory, including Alsace-Lorraine, Allied occupation of the Rhineland, the return of French and Belgian railroad equipment, and the surrender of all submarines to a neutral power. These terms were, according to historian Bullitt Lowry, less harsh than France's ideas and more harsh than those of the United Kingdom.[1]

Wilson, however, worried that terms dictated by the military would be overly harsh. Two days after the Senlis conference, Wilson sent a telegram to Pershing explicitly disagreeing with the latter's ideas, arguing that only the demand that Germany vacate occupied territory was reasonable, and even then, Germany would only have to surrender some of its weapons.[2] According to Lowry, of the several ways in which Pershing could have responded to the telegram, he chose an action that "would allow him to seek harsh terms but which would not leave him open to charges of direct disobedience … He suddenly opposed granting any armistice at all."[3]

To express this new viewpoint, Pershing sent a letter on October 30 to the Supreme War Council of the Allies. In 13 numbered points, Pershing argues against the armistice. For instance, after surveying the man- and firepower of the respective sides, he writes, "An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German army and enable it to organize and resist later on and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end."[4] In addition, he makes it clear that only surrender is acceptable: "A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her."[5] He closes the letter by calling for "unconditional surrender."[6]

Two competing interpretations exist for Pershing's writing of the letter. For his part, Lowry argues that the letter was a feigned statement of positions designed to assure that the armistice that did emerge would contain terms as harsh as he had recommended at Senlis. "[T]he evidence," Lowry writes, "indicates that Pershing did not resist granting an armistice; he only resisted granting a lenient one."[7] He justifies this position on the basis of an absence of significant influence on Pershing to change his position between the Senlis conference and his receipt of Wilson's telegram.[8]

In contrast, Lowry's sometime colleague at the University of North Texas, Frank E. Vandiver, argues that there was a significant incident in the four days between Senlis and the telegram: specifically, according to Vandiver, Pershing spent those days sick with the flu, which caused him to be out of the loop. Moreover, Vandiver continues, because another telegram received by Pershing over this period, from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, requested Pershing's continued input into the armistice process, resulting in a simple misunderstanding. Vandiver writes, "Pershing took this to mean that he could express his ideas to the Supreme War Council; Baker and Wilson meant it as a courteous invitation to private correspondence with them."[9]

Whether the letter was a deliberate tactic or a mistake, its influence on the final terms of the armistice are undeniable. For instance, in the clauses regarding the western front, the document reads, "Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice.[10] In addition, clauses five and nine, respectively, require evacuation of the Rhineland and Allied military occupation thereof (albeit excluding Alsace-Lorraine). Finally, clause four demands the surrender of significant numbers of Germany's guns: 2,500 heavy guns, 2,500 field guns, and 25,000 machine guns.[11] -- a number greater than Pershing states in his first point that Germany has overall.[12]

In the end, Wilson, not Pershing, negotiated the armistice, but the terms were largely Pershing's. Thus did the roles of the president and military remain separate. As commander-in-chief and head of the cabinet, Wilson maintained the prerogative to make the final decisions about the terms of the armistice. However, because of his trust of the military to understand matters on the ground better than he, Wilson took Pershing's suggestions seriously, as a President should of his military leaders. In this manner, the distinct leadership roles of both men were honored.

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[1] Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," Journal of American History 55, no. 2 (Sept. 1968): 282-83

[2] Ibid, 283-84.

[3] Ibid, 285.

[4] John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, to the Allied Supreme War Council, October 28, 1918. United States Department of State Office of the Historian. Accessed September 7, 2016, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914-20v02/d124, point 6.

[5] Ibid, point 9.

[6] Ibid, point 13.

[7] Lowry, ibid, 287,

[8] Ibid, 285.

[9] Frank E Vandiver, "Commander-in-Chief-Commander Relationships: Wilson and Pershing," Rice University Studies 57, no. 1 (1971):

[10] "Allied Armistice Terms with Germany," firstworldwar.com, accessed September 7, 2016, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/armisticeterms.htm, I.ii.

[11] Ibid, I.iv, v, ix.

[12] Pershing, ibid, point 1.

The Sixtus Affair

Several political, social, and economic realities impacted the home fronts in the nations engaged in World War I. For Austria-Hungary, perhaps the most substantive political event was the death of Emperor Franz Josef on November 21, 1916, after a reign of almost 68 years. The Emperor was quite old by the time the world broke out. Michael Howard writes, "His successor, the young Emperor Karl, at once established 'back channels' with France to discuss peace terms,"[1] but his summary of Karl's efforts is a true understatement.

By the time Franz Josef died, the Austro-Hungarian military had proved itself essentially worthless, losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers but gained nothing in the process. Moreover, the responsibility of the Reichswehr to the Austrians under their treaty obligations had the Germans commented that, in their alliance, they described themselves as an eine Leiche gekettet (shackled to a corpse). Given these conditions, it was only reasonable that Karl would pursue a peace settlement, although perhaps not a separate peace that would not involve Germany.

Early in 1917, Emperor Karl sent letters to the French government via Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, his brother-in-law, to determine whether the French would be agreeable to pursuing a separate peace. The negotiations failed but came to light the following year when French Prime Minister Clemenceau leaked the details to the press. Rather than admit the attempt was true and risk seeming to have betrayed his German allies, Karl instead denied the contacts and prevented any further negotiations with the Triple Entente from occurring.

The Austrian historian Martin Mutschlechner writes, "The Sixtus Affair was a diplomatic débacle of the first order for Austria and deprived the Habsburg Monarchy of the little freedom of movement in foreign affairs it still possessed. Emperor Karl now had no option but to fall in step with Germany’s intensified war effort."[2] The subsequent dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire upon its loss to the Entente demonstrates the extent to which Karl's shift in goals in war contributed to his own eventual downfall.

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     [1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 1206.

     [2] Martin Mutschlechner, "The Sixtus Affair: A Major Diplomatic Débacle," trans. by Peter John Nicholson, The World of the Habsburgs, Accessed September 4, 2016, http://ww1.habsburger.net/en/chapters/sixtus-affair-major-diplomatic-debacle, para. 8.

Telegraphy and the Armenian Genocide

Of the many inhumane phenomena to arise from the inherent inhumane experience of war, the most inhumane is genocide. At least as understood since the 20th century, genocide is thankfully an infrequent occurrence. The first genocide of the 20th century was that of the Ottoman Armenian population of eastern Anatolia at the hands of the Ottoman Army and irregular forces during World War I. Among the forces that contributed to the emergence of genocide as a consequence of war was the increased technological advances of modern armies. In the case of the Armenian genocide, a pivotal technology that contributed to its unfolding was the wireless telegraph.

World War I was the first major conflict in which all major combatants had access to wireless telegraphy. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, historian Taner Akçam of Clark University (Mass.) has detailed the extent to which telegraphic communications played a role in internal communications regarding the Armenian genocide, as well as in the covering up of these crimes -- both during their commission and once they were over. In particular, Akçam details how a dual system of telegrams was established between Mehmet Talaat Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior during the genocide, and local and regional offices of the government in eastern Anatolia. Official telegraph channels sent communications that, while explicit on the matter of the expulsion from their homes and expropriation of the property of the Armenians, lacked any specific content on murderous actions against these civilians. In contrast, telegraphs sent from Talaat's home were explicit and often contradicted "official" communications.[1] Establishing this dual track of communications emanating from Talaat's offices and home is an inherently difficult undertaking, Akçam concedes, because of pervasive orders for telegrams to be destroyed after reading. In searching Ottoman archives, Akçam himself was only able to identify three such telegrams that escaped this fate.[2]

Nevertheless, primary sources that survived the war indicate that the "sanitized" language of many surviving telegrams had more insidious intent. For instance, the series of telegrams known as the "Andonian telegrams," which date from March 1915 to January 1916, are often explicit in exhorting action, but none of the documents is clear that the physical extermination of Armenian civilians regardless of sex and age is the actual policy. Examining the telegrams illustrates this issue. As an example, the telegram of March 25 states is quite explicit in calling for violence, calling for "wiping out of existence the well-known elements who for centuries have been the barrier to the empire's progress in civilization,"[3] using the terms "uproot and annihilate"[4] and "very bloody methods."[5] However, nowhere in the document are Armenians mentioned specifically, and the telegram can easily be interpreted as indicating that only guerrillas or terrorists are to be executed.

Similarly, the telegram of September 3, even as it refers to the inclusion of women and children "in the orders which have been previously prescribed as to be applied to the males of the intended persons,”[6] is sanitized to the extent that the orders are not specified and could easily refer only to expulsion and not mass murder. The telegram of September 16, perhaps the most explicit of all in referring to a government order to "to destroy completely all the indicated persons [Armenians] living in Turkey," is nevertheless vague on the identity of the indicated persons and could easily refer, again, to guerrillas and terrorists.[7] Even those telegrams that refer to dead bodies seen on roads or by American observers could be depicted to be the unfortunate "collateral damage" inflicted in anti-insurgency actions against Armenian separatists.

However, another primary source unearthed in 1993 by the sociologist and historian Vahakn Dadrian, director of the Zoryan Institute (Mass.), makes clear the true intent of the murkier Andonian telegrams. This document, referred to as the "Ten Commandments" by the British officials who found it in 1919,[8] is explicit where the telegrams are not. For example, the third "commandment" directs local officials to "provoke organised [sic] massacres" in the Armenian areas, to be committed by the Muslim populations, with the fourth commandment advising the use of faked intervention by the gendarmerie in some areas but to collaborate actively with the massacres in others.[9] Most explicit of all are the fifth commandment -- "Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and children to be Islamized" and the eighth commandment -- "Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army -- this to be left to the military to do."[10] Importantly, Dadrian is careful to consider the provenance and authenticity of the document,[11] before using it to support his theory of premeditation with regard to the genocide at large.

In conclusion, wireless telegraphy contributed enormously to the ability of the Ottomans to exterminate the Armenian population in eastern Anatolia. In addition, it allowed for the establishment of a dual system of communications: one sanitized for general consumption and one far more explicit in its exhortations to mass murder. Although the factors that contributed to the Armenian genocide existed independent of the modern technologies introduced in World War I, it is likely that the rapidity and ultimately the success of the genocide would have been less had wireless telegraphy not been available to Talaat Pasha and the Ottoman leadership.

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[1] Taner Akçam, The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2012), 383.

[2] Ibid, 292.

[3] Mehmet Talaat Pasha, "Talaat Pasha's Alleged Official Orders Regarding the Armenian Massacres, March 1915-January 1916," firstworldwar.com, accessed August 9, 2016, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/armenia_talaatorders.htm, para. 1.

[4] Ibid, para. 2.

[5] Ibid, para. 3.

[6] Ibid, para. 1.

[7] Ibid, para. 1, the bracketed word has been interpolated by the translator.

[8] Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7, no. 2 (1993): 173.

[9] Ibid, 174.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid, 178-80.

Hasty Mobilization in World War I

For Germany, a hard-learned lesson of the first year of the war was that how it interpreted the act of military mobilization was not the same as other nations' interpretations. As a result of this assumption, Germany declared war on Russia although it is not clear that Russia undertook mobilization for reasons other than preparedness in the event that a negotiated settlement to the Austrian-Serbian conflict failed. Because of Germany's declaration against Russia, the conflict truly became continent wide, with Germany's first move the violation of Belgium's neutrality and the U.K.'s entry into the war -- an action it undertook because it believed that it had to eliminate the threat of France to successfully counter Russia.

Michael Howard writes in his book on the war, "On 30 July Czar Nicholas II, with extreme hesitation, ordered the mobilization of all Russian armed forces. It was generally assumed that mobilization led inevitably to Aufmarsch, the deployment of armies for the invasion of their neighbors, and that such deployment led with equal inevitability to war."[1] On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia when the latter refused to submit to all of the demands made on it in the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Immediately, Russia undertook steps to mobilized its armed forces, seeking to protect its own interests, as well as its Orthodox Christian ally.

Canadian historian Gordon Martel has written extensively on the topic of the initial mobilization, and he emphasizes the deliberations that occurred between July 28 and the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1. For instance, Martel writes that, on July 29, "A message announcing a general mobilization in Russia had been drafted and ready to be sent out [sic] by 9 p.m. Then, just minutes before it was to be sent out, a personal messenger from the Tsar arrived, instructing that it the general mobilization be cancelled and a partial one re-instituted. The Tsar wanted to hear how the Kaiser would respond to his latest telegram before proceeding"[2]

Over the next two days, Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm volleyed back and forth over whether mobilization would mean war. The day of the war declaration, Martel notes, "Nicholas said he understood that, under the circumstances, Germany was obliged to mobilize, but he asked Wilhelm to give him the same guarantee that he had given Wilhelm: ‘that these measures DO NOT mean war’ and that they would continue to negotiate ‘for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to our hearts'." [3] Despite this assurance from the Tsar, who truly did not want war against Germany, Germany declared war the same day.

Although Martel's depiction of the negotiations is intricate, it is important to bear in mind that they occurred over only three days and not in person. A 12-hour ultimatum issued by Germany to Russia was an overly hasty act, motivated by worry among the Germans about the French-Russian alliance and concern that a two-front war would be impossible to fight. Thus, in the mistaken belief that France could be easily knocked out of the war, particularly if the U.K. hesitated to intervene, Germany forced the hand of Russia and mobilized against Belgium, forcing the U.K.'s hand as well. The length of Germany's campaign in the west was far longer than expected, and Germany ended up getting the two-front war it sought to avoid.

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     [1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 626.
     [2] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Wednesday, 29 July 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/07/29-july-1914-russian-mobilization-first-world-war/#sthash.JHq57BWe.dpuf
     [3] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Saturday, 1 August 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/08/1-august-1914-germany-declares-war-on-russia/#sthash.pZxmFsiY.dpuf

Ottoman Entry Into WWI

I've begun my next course, this one on World War I. Only five discussion posts in this class, but a longer research agenda is coming soon.

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Of the countries participating in World War I, perhaps no country was undergoing quite as extensive a shift in national identity at the time as the Ottoman Empire. For hundreds of years a multi-national, multi-religious (although Muslim majority) empire run by a Turkish elite, a series of wars beginning in the early 18th century had taken their toll on the empire's territorial integrity. These losses were most precipitous in North Africa and the Balkans, so that by 1912, the empire's European holdings consisted only of parts of Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia and the Greek areas of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus -- and these territories were all lost by 1913. As a result of this contraction in territory, the Young Turks, in theory a modernizing party with ecumenical interests that had seized power in a 1908 revolution, turned to Turkish nationalism as a way of galvanizing the population around the national idea as a way of preventing further losses.[1] From the standpoint of Clausewitz's "trinity" of government -- government, military, and popular "passions"[2] -- the Young Turks'  nationalist campaign can be understood as a linchpin in the Ottomans' decision to enter World War I and the side it chose.

Regarding government, the Young Turks as the ruling party saw its primary goal as the prevention of further territorial loss from the empire. However, it was not only wars that threatened the empire. The population of Anatolia -- now viewed by the Young Turks as the launching ground for a larger pan-Turanian movement -- was ethnically and religiously divided, particularly in the eastern provinces. There, in addition to Arabs and Kurds, who were Muslims, there were large populations of Christians, mostly Armenian, who were a focus of resentment exploited by the Young Turks to unify ethnic Turks.  Subjected to periodic massacres by previous governments, most recently in 1909, the Armenians sought international protection, which came in the form of a quasi-protectorate created in the six provinces in which Armenians constituted a majority, the security of which was guaranteed by Russia and France, the latter of whom held a large proportion of the empire's debt.[3] While theoretically intolerable to nationalists like the Young Turks, the leadership had no option but to accept the "solution" imposed in February 1914 but knew a war would free its hand to alter the demographic situation through radical social engineering. This desire dictated, to no small extent, the Ottomans'  decision to side with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the war.[4]

However, military concerns were also important. Here, in addition to the aforementioned unwelcome influence of Russia in the eastern provinces, there was already Russian expansion into the Caucasus, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and eastern Armenia, that threatened the eastern border directly. In addition, given the Orthodox  and Slavic causes that led Russia to enter the war on Serbia's side, Russian intervention in the Balkans could directly threaten the imperial capital of Constantinople, which was still the most important city in Orthodox Christianity despite annexation by the Ottomans in the 15th century. This interest on Russia's part was not merely religious; control of Constantinople meant control of the Dardanelles and, by extension, control over the entire Black Sea. Thus, Russia and the Ottomans both had economic motives underlying the military incentives that they saw as essential to their war goals. Thus, by allying with Russia's enemies, the Ottomans hoped to maintain control of its remaining territory and perhaps extend its influence in the Caucasus.[5]

The most complicated piece of Clausewitz's formulation is the "passion"  component. By 1914, the Ottoman population was extraordinarily war-weary. To this extent, therefore, the Ottoman people were certainly not clamoring for war when it broke out.  As a result, it was necessary for the Ottoman leadership to deploy two strategies to motivate the population. First, it was necessary, with German prodding, for the caliphate to declare that the war against the Entente was a jihad, and thus a religious obligation for all Muslims. Although this call motivated some, the response to this call was generally anemic; it also decidedly lacked an effect on non-Muslim populations in the empire, who were still fairly numerous.[6] Therefore, the second strategy of identifying internal enemies -- particularly in the form of the Armenians to also extended to non-Turks generally at certain points -- as fifth columns participating in the empire's collapse. This was an effective strategy in so far as these populations also existed on the other side of the empire's borders with Russia and Persia. Of course, it also resulted in murderous violence against the Armenian population, who, in keeping with the political motivations for war, were expelled en masse from their homes toward the Syrian desert and subjected to massacres along the way.

In conclusion, while political and military considerations are easy to identify for the Ottoman Empire in its choices at the beginning of World War I, the issue of popular enthusiasm was decidedly lacking. Unlike other participants in the war, rather than a primary goal of expanding its territory, the empire sought to prevent even further losses and to reverse what it considered to be foreign encroachment on its sovereignty. However, like the other participants, nationalism was a key component in the attempts to prevent such losses. The extent to which this nationalism was embraced by the population varied over time, although it eventually became the national ideology of the modern Turkish republic. Nevertheless, it did not save the empire from complete disintegration.

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     [1] Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 4.
     [2] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 1.
     [3] Notably, entering the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary afforded the Ottoman Empire the opportunity to renege on repaying this debt.
     [4] Eugene L. Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2015), chapter 3, page 5, EPUB.
     [5] Ibid, chapter 2, page 5.
     [6] Ibid, chapter 5, page 42.