Did Germany Actually Win the War?

My post for this week is inspired by the following quotation, which I read only two days ago for the first time. It surprised me at first and then struck me as somewhat perceptive. Now, however, I see the authors as having emphasized Germany's "victory" too much:

In strategic terms Germany had won the Great War. Its industrial base remained intact; it lost little territory of value; it now fronted on one major power (a debilitated France) rather than three (France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia). Its industrial strength, its geographic position, and the size of its population gave it the greatest economic potential in Europe, while the small states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans were all open to German political and economic domination.[1]

The authors, Murray and Millett, go on to discuss the Dolchstoss (stab in the back) myth that emerged with the armistice and Versailles treaty, suggesting that the reality of the peace settlement was quite different from the myth that persisted into the 1920s.

Considering each of Murray and Millett's points, we can both determine the extent to which they are valid claims and include that points that they do not consider. First, the claim that Germany's "industrial base remained intact"[2] seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. While the Ruhr region remained under German sovereignty, the coal of the Saar region was ceded to France, leaving Germany without an important power source. Moreover, in losing urban regions in the east -- particularly those around Danzig -- other important industrial bases were lost. Thus, while the most important industrial region was intact, there were important losses, and these losses were made more severe by the reparations regime imposed on Germany under the Versailles treaty. It is somewhat unfair to consider this lost territory as lacking value.

Second, it is true that Germany how had only one major power on its frontiers, rather than three. Austria-Hungary had been an ally, so its dissolution actually might have been considered more of a threat were it not for the inherent weakness of the successor states that emerged. France, which already had a smaller population that Germany, had now an even smaller population due to combat losses. Most importantly, there was now a cordon sanitaire separating Russia and Germany, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Any assault on Germany from the east would afford quite a bit of warning for Germany going forward, which was a major defense advantage.

Third, while the economic potential for Germany certainly existed after World War I, as noted above, the reparations regime and, more importantly, the means by which Germany sought to fulfill its obligations -- specifically the printing of money, resulting in hyperinflation -- had catastrophic effects for Germany during the 1920s until implementation of the Dawes Plan to stabilize Germany's currency. As a result, any real economic potential of Germany was gravely compromised by the terms of the peace.

Finally, there is the question of a sphere of influence for Germany among the new states in central and eastern Europe. This seems to have been largely true in 1919, although with the emergence of fascist Italy in 1922 as a regional power, this potential for Germany to establish a sphere of influence was somewhat diluted. Moreover, the terms of the Versailles treaty and subsequent League of Nations resolutions prevented Germany from pressing its hard to heavily in the region. For example, while ethnicity and internal Austrian political trends dictated that Germany's influence would be strong in the new Republic of Austria, attempts at political union were squelched and even economic cooperation was frowned upon as an attempt at German expansion.[3]

Therefore, I think it's safe to conclude that, while Germany was successful in maintaining its continued existence, its ability to preserve itself was compromised. That said, considering the alternatives that could have been foisted upon Germany, including its complete dissolution -- it was, after all, less than 50 years old as a state -- it was at least technically preserved, although the extent to which such a state could persist in the long term given the crippling reparations imposed on it is questionable.

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     [1] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2001), 3.
     [2] Ibid.
     [3] Steve Beller, A Concise History of Austria (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007): 197-230.