In my last post, I noted how I'd set about to reading Eric Cline's 1177 B.C. Ah, but the best laid plans of mice and men and all that. I stopped a couple of chapters in to pick up Hans-Ulrich Wehler's The German Empire: 1871-1918. Wehler takes a very straight line approach from Bismarck to Hitler, and his treatment of the period specifically under discussion is pretty relentlessly Marxist. That said, with the exception of some purely economic sections on GDP, defense spending, etc., that are pretty dry, The German Empire is a pretty swift read (approx. 300 pages) and a fairly thorough discussion of how and why Bismarck forged together the empire, where the loci of power lay over the empire's 47-year history, and how World War I and the subsequent revolution that ushered in the Weimar Republic were the logical culmination of the attempts by entrenched military and agricultural interests in the north and east of the country to hold onto authoritarian power in the face of rising democratic and socialist thinking.
The other book I've been reading as part of brushing up on German history pre- and post-Third Reich is Michael Frayn's play Democracy, which covers pretty much the whole tenure of Willy Brandt as Chancellor of Germany (1969 to 1974), from his election at the head of the first leftist government in postwar West Germany to his resignation in the face of the discovery that one of his top aides, Günter Guillaume, was a spy for East Germany. This was a story with which I was wholly unfamiliar until a few weeks ago, and in seeking sources on the topic, I came across Frayn's play relatively early and thought it would be a quick way to get myself familiar with the story before diving into something more substantive on the Brandt period generally. I've got a lengthier Brandt bio on deck, as well as some other stuff on the 1953 workers uprising in East Germany.
Still waiting on a decision letter to decide my future course on graduate studies. More on that eventually, I assume...
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Friday, February 16, 2018
Sunday, December 4, 2016
Strategic Bombing: A Moral Hazard?
To say that the Allied campaign of "strategic bombing" during World War II was controversial is ans understatement. With the exception of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it might be the single most debated purely military aspect of the war. While the initial reactions to the strategic bombings of Germany might have been quite positive from the standpoint of military assessments, time has tempered this uniform positivity; moreover, the moral aspect of the bombings has continued to be a concern for analysts.
Before the war was even over, proponents of strategic bombing such as J.M. Spaight, a one-time assistant secretary in the Air Ministry of the U.K., were justifying the tactic. In his widely distributed pamphlet Bombing Vindicated, Spaight relies heavily on tu quoque arguments along the lines of "Germany did x, so we are justified in doing y." Strictly from a logical standpoint, his argument therefore is flawed. Nevertheless, the distinctions he attempts to draw between combatants and civilians are important ones, particularly as it regards civilians working in military industries. Spaight writes, "To spare them might mean, however, that the lives of one's own fighting men were sacrificed. It is to save these men's lives to put a war-plant out of operation or to stop a trainload of munitions from reaching the front."[1]
However, this statement fails to recognize a key distinction in international law between combatants and civilians, i.e., that it is an accepted convention of warfare that combatants' lives are more expendable than those of civilians, if only because the first rule of warfare is that combatants will die, whereas only extraordinarily recently has warfare endangered the lives of large numbers of civilians. A moral calculus that states that one's combatants will suffer fewer deaths than one's enemy's combatants is wholly defensible; one that states that one's combatants will suffer fewer deaths by taking the lives of one's enemy's civilian population is less so.
In an assessment of strategic bombing written 40 years after the war was over, Kenneth P. Werrell of the U.S. Naval Institute offered some specifics of the strategic bombing campaign while specifically avoiding a moral justification. He noted that nearly one-quarter of bombs were dropped on non-strategic targets,[2] that the losses suffered by the RAF, particularly of officers, was hard to justify,[3] and that German production actually peaked during the strategic bombing,[4] although the latter point was perhaps a consequence of late full mobilization of the Nazis, which was not until after Stalingrad. The chief benefits, Werrell notes, besides negative effects on morale,[5] were the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the need of Germany to divert forces in response to the bombing, and the economic effects.[6] From his standpoint, the strategic bombing was clearly worth the lives that were lost -- military and civilian included.
That said, I can't help but wonder how assessments of strategic bombing such as Spaight's and Werrell's would have been affected had the Allies not won the war. If the U.K. had lost the Battle of Britain, would Spaight and Werrell justify the Blitz as one of the factors in that defeat? If the Axis powers had won, would Tojo and Momma have put Stimson and Macarthur on trial and hanged them? Certainly, to the victors go the spoils, but the mere fact that some of the people sentenced at Nuremberg committed crimes no more serious than those committed by the Allies (e.g., Doenitz serving 10 years for unlimited submarine warfare) is troublesome. In the end, it seems that, from a strictly military point of view, the strategic bombing campaign was justified, but I don't think it can ever be morally justified.
=====
[1] J.M. Spaight, Bombing Vindicated (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), 116.
[2] Kenneth P. Werrell, "The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments," Journal of American History, 73, no. 3 (1986): 707.
[3] Ibid, 708.
[4] Ibid, 711.
[5] Ibid, 712.
[6] Ibid, 709.
Before the war was even over, proponents of strategic bombing such as J.M. Spaight, a one-time assistant secretary in the Air Ministry of the U.K., were justifying the tactic. In his widely distributed pamphlet Bombing Vindicated, Spaight relies heavily on tu quoque arguments along the lines of "Germany did x, so we are justified in doing y." Strictly from a logical standpoint, his argument therefore is flawed. Nevertheless, the distinctions he attempts to draw between combatants and civilians are important ones, particularly as it regards civilians working in military industries. Spaight writes, "To spare them might mean, however, that the lives of one's own fighting men were sacrificed. It is to save these men's lives to put a war-plant out of operation or to stop a trainload of munitions from reaching the front."[1]
However, this statement fails to recognize a key distinction in international law between combatants and civilians, i.e., that it is an accepted convention of warfare that combatants' lives are more expendable than those of civilians, if only because the first rule of warfare is that combatants will die, whereas only extraordinarily recently has warfare endangered the lives of large numbers of civilians. A moral calculus that states that one's combatants will suffer fewer deaths than one's enemy's combatants is wholly defensible; one that states that one's combatants will suffer fewer deaths by taking the lives of one's enemy's civilian population is less so.
In an assessment of strategic bombing written 40 years after the war was over, Kenneth P. Werrell of the U.S. Naval Institute offered some specifics of the strategic bombing campaign while specifically avoiding a moral justification. He noted that nearly one-quarter of bombs were dropped on non-strategic targets,[2] that the losses suffered by the RAF, particularly of officers, was hard to justify,[3] and that German production actually peaked during the strategic bombing,[4] although the latter point was perhaps a consequence of late full mobilization of the Nazis, which was not until after Stalingrad. The chief benefits, Werrell notes, besides negative effects on morale,[5] were the defeat of the Luftwaffe, the need of Germany to divert forces in response to the bombing, and the economic effects.[6] From his standpoint, the strategic bombing was clearly worth the lives that were lost -- military and civilian included.
That said, I can't help but wonder how assessments of strategic bombing such as Spaight's and Werrell's would have been affected had the Allies not won the war. If the U.K. had lost the Battle of Britain, would Spaight and Werrell justify the Blitz as one of the factors in that defeat? If the Axis powers had won, would Tojo and Momma have put Stimson and Macarthur on trial and hanged them? Certainly, to the victors go the spoils, but the mere fact that some of the people sentenced at Nuremberg committed crimes no more serious than those committed by the Allies (e.g., Doenitz serving 10 years for unlimited submarine warfare) is troublesome. In the end, it seems that, from a strictly military point of view, the strategic bombing campaign was justified, but I don't think it can ever be morally justified.
=====
[1] J.M. Spaight, Bombing Vindicated (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), 116.
[2] Kenneth P. Werrell, "The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments," Journal of American History, 73, no. 3 (1986): 707.
[3] Ibid, 708.
[4] Ibid, 711.
[5] Ibid, 712.
[6] Ibid, 709.
Thursday, September 29, 2016
Did Germany Actually Win the War?
My post for this week is inspired by the following quotation, which I read only two days ago for the first time. It surprised me at first and then struck me as somewhat perceptive. Now, however, I see the authors as having emphasized Germany's "victory" too much:
The authors, Murray and Millett, go on to discuss the Dolchstoss (stab in the back) myth that emerged with the armistice and Versailles treaty, suggesting that the reality of the peace settlement was quite different from the myth that persisted into the 1920s.
Considering each of Murray and Millett's points, we can both determine the extent to which they are valid claims and include that points that they do not consider. First, the claim that Germany's "industrial base remained intact"[2] seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. While the Ruhr region remained under German sovereignty, the coal of the Saar region was ceded to France, leaving Germany without an important power source. Moreover, in losing urban regions in the east -- particularly those around Danzig -- other important industrial bases were lost. Thus, while the most important industrial region was intact, there were important losses, and these losses were made more severe by the reparations regime imposed on Germany under the Versailles treaty. It is somewhat unfair to consider this lost territory as lacking value.
Second, it is true that Germany how had only one major power on its frontiers, rather than three. Austria-Hungary had been an ally, so its dissolution actually might have been considered more of a threat were it not for the inherent weakness of the successor states that emerged. France, which already had a smaller population that Germany, had now an even smaller population due to combat losses. Most importantly, there was now a cordon sanitaire separating Russia and Germany, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Any assault on Germany from the east would afford quite a bit of warning for Germany going forward, which was a major defense advantage.
Third, while the economic potential for Germany certainly existed after World War I, as noted above, the reparations regime and, more importantly, the means by which Germany sought to fulfill its obligations -- specifically the printing of money, resulting in hyperinflation -- had catastrophic effects for Germany during the 1920s until implementation of the Dawes Plan to stabilize Germany's currency. As a result, any real economic potential of Germany was gravely compromised by the terms of the peace.
Finally, there is the question of a sphere of influence for Germany among the new states in central and eastern Europe. This seems to have been largely true in 1919, although with the emergence of fascist Italy in 1922 as a regional power, this potential for Germany to establish a sphere of influence was somewhat diluted. Moreover, the terms of the Versailles treaty and subsequent League of Nations resolutions prevented Germany from pressing its hard to heavily in the region. For example, while ethnicity and internal Austrian political trends dictated that Germany's influence would be strong in the new Republic of Austria, attempts at political union were squelched and even economic cooperation was frowned upon as an attempt at German expansion.[3]
Therefore, I think it's safe to conclude that, while Germany was successful in maintaining its continued existence, its ability to preserve itself was compromised. That said, considering the alternatives that could have been foisted upon Germany, including its complete dissolution -- it was, after all, less than 50 years old as a state -- it was at least technically preserved, although the extent to which such a state could persist in the long term given the crippling reparations imposed on it is questionable.
In strategic terms Germany had won the Great War. Its industrial base remained intact; it lost little territory of value; it now fronted on one major power (a debilitated France) rather than three (France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia). Its industrial strength, its geographic position, and the size of its population gave it the greatest economic potential in Europe, while the small states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans were all open to German political and economic domination.[1]
The authors, Murray and Millett, go on to discuss the Dolchstoss (stab in the back) myth that emerged with the armistice and Versailles treaty, suggesting that the reality of the peace settlement was quite different from the myth that persisted into the 1920s.
Considering each of Murray and Millett's points, we can both determine the extent to which they are valid claims and include that points that they do not consider. First, the claim that Germany's "industrial base remained intact"[2] seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. While the Ruhr region remained under German sovereignty, the coal of the Saar region was ceded to France, leaving Germany without an important power source. Moreover, in losing urban regions in the east -- particularly those around Danzig -- other important industrial bases were lost. Thus, while the most important industrial region was intact, there were important losses, and these losses were made more severe by the reparations regime imposed on Germany under the Versailles treaty. It is somewhat unfair to consider this lost territory as lacking value.
Second, it is true that Germany how had only one major power on its frontiers, rather than three. Austria-Hungary had been an ally, so its dissolution actually might have been considered more of a threat were it not for the inherent weakness of the successor states that emerged. France, which already had a smaller population that Germany, had now an even smaller population due to combat losses. Most importantly, there was now a cordon sanitaire separating Russia and Germany, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Any assault on Germany from the east would afford quite a bit of warning for Germany going forward, which was a major defense advantage.
Third, while the economic potential for Germany certainly existed after World War I, as noted above, the reparations regime and, more importantly, the means by which Germany sought to fulfill its obligations -- specifically the printing of money, resulting in hyperinflation -- had catastrophic effects for Germany during the 1920s until implementation of the Dawes Plan to stabilize Germany's currency. As a result, any real economic potential of Germany was gravely compromised by the terms of the peace.
Finally, there is the question of a sphere of influence for Germany among the new states in central and eastern Europe. This seems to have been largely true in 1919, although with the emergence of fascist Italy in 1922 as a regional power, this potential for Germany to establish a sphere of influence was somewhat diluted. Moreover, the terms of the Versailles treaty and subsequent League of Nations resolutions prevented Germany from pressing its hard to heavily in the region. For example, while ethnicity and internal Austrian political trends dictated that Germany's influence would be strong in the new Republic of Austria, attempts at political union were squelched and even economic cooperation was frowned upon as an attempt at German expansion.[3]
Therefore, I think it's safe to conclude that, while Germany was successful in maintaining its continued existence, its ability to preserve itself was compromised. That said, considering the alternatives that could have been foisted upon Germany, including its complete dissolution -- it was, after all, less than 50 years old as a state -- it was at least technically preserved, although the extent to which such a state could persist in the long term given the crippling reparations imposed on it is questionable.
====
[1] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2001), 3.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Steve Beller, A Concise History of Austria (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007): 197-230.
[1] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2001), 3.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Steve Beller, A Concise History of Austria (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007): 197-230.
Monday, September 26, 2016
Political Destabilization in WWI Germany
It is axiomatic that World War I had tremendous impacts on Germany, and these effects were political, economic, and social. These effects were, to a very large extent, interrelated, since economic causes often underpin political and social changes. However, in terms of the long-term effects of the changes wrought by Germany's involved in WWI, I believe the political changes were the most important.
In his book, Michael Howard notes that tension arose in the last two years of the war between the High Command, which attained control over the German economy in 1917 to assure full economic mobilization, and the Reichstag, i.e., the popularly elected legislature, which controlled government spending.[1] The most popular political party in Germany was the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which had finished first in election in Germany since its legalization in 1890, but it had been prevented from holding political power on the basis of Germany's constitution not guaranteeing proportional representation. A combination of factors in early 1917, including the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war, caused a split in the SPD on the basis of ongoing support for the war.[2] While the newly formed United SPD opposed the war on principle, the remaining SPD sought to turn the situation with the High Command to its advantage by asking Chancellor Bethmann for democratic reforms. Instead, Theobald von Bethmann was pushed out of the Chancellery in favor of Georg Michaelis, who supported the High Command's position and helped them to consolidate their power under the Banner of the Fatherland Party.[3]
On short order in 1918 came the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia and the March offensive in the west by General Ludendorff. When it ultimately failed, the High Command appealed to U.S. President Wilson for peace on the basis of the latter's Fourteen Points. Michaelis was replaced by Prince Max of Baden, who immediately sued for peace. In this environment, the SPD was able to push their earlier democratic reforms, including proportional representation, through successfully, with an SPD member, Philipp Scheidemann, even entering the cabinet in the fall as the de facto Foreign Minister.[4] The long-brewing mutiny in the military begin in Kiel on November 4, the Kaiser fled the country on November 8, and the following day, Scheidemann proclaimed Germany to be a republic. The new government was dominated by the SPD and signed the armistice ending the war on November 11, with the new Chancellor Friedrich Ebert telling the press that the revolution was over.[5]
Thus, Ludendorff's offensive in early 1918 can be seen as a last-ditch attempt by the High Command to prevent the inevitable -- a truly democratic government led by the SPD that would make peace without annexations, proving that the whole effort of the war had been for naught. The High Command's actions thereafter provide further proof of the nature of the offensive. Of course, the new SPD-led government would lay the groundwork for future disaster, not only in signing and then continuing to defend the humiliating Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 -- which would come to be known as the "stab in the back" to which Hitler would often refer -- but also in empowering the right-wing Freikorps militias in using them to put down the Bolshevik-inspired rebellions that occurred in the same year. As historian David Blackbourn has written, however, the SPD did manage to institute several important social reforms, as well as prevent right-wing authoritarian takeovers like that in Hungary, which experienced similar left-wing revolutionary activity.[6] To that extent, although the fight against authoritarianism ultimately failed in Germany, it was successful in the short term owing to the efforts of the SPD.
In his book, Michael Howard notes that tension arose in the last two years of the war between the High Command, which attained control over the German economy in 1917 to assure full economic mobilization, and the Reichstag, i.e., the popularly elected legislature, which controlled government spending.[1] The most popular political party in Germany was the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which had finished first in election in Germany since its legalization in 1890, but it had been prevented from holding political power on the basis of Germany's constitution not guaranteeing proportional representation. A combination of factors in early 1917, including the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war, caused a split in the SPD on the basis of ongoing support for the war.[2] While the newly formed United SPD opposed the war on principle, the remaining SPD sought to turn the situation with the High Command to its advantage by asking Chancellor Bethmann for democratic reforms. Instead, Theobald von Bethmann was pushed out of the Chancellery in favor of Georg Michaelis, who supported the High Command's position and helped them to consolidate their power under the Banner of the Fatherland Party.[3]
On short order in 1918 came the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia and the March offensive in the west by General Ludendorff. When it ultimately failed, the High Command appealed to U.S. President Wilson for peace on the basis of the latter's Fourteen Points. Michaelis was replaced by Prince Max of Baden, who immediately sued for peace. In this environment, the SPD was able to push their earlier democratic reforms, including proportional representation, through successfully, with an SPD member, Philipp Scheidemann, even entering the cabinet in the fall as the de facto Foreign Minister.[4] The long-brewing mutiny in the military begin in Kiel on November 4, the Kaiser fled the country on November 8, and the following day, Scheidemann proclaimed Germany to be a republic. The new government was dominated by the SPD and signed the armistice ending the war on November 11, with the new Chancellor Friedrich Ebert telling the press that the revolution was over.[5]
Thus, Ludendorff's offensive in early 1918 can be seen as a last-ditch attempt by the High Command to prevent the inevitable -- a truly democratic government led by the SPD that would make peace without annexations, proving that the whole effort of the war had been for naught. The High Command's actions thereafter provide further proof of the nature of the offensive. Of course, the new SPD-led government would lay the groundwork for future disaster, not only in signing and then continuing to defend the humiliating Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 -- which would come to be known as the "stab in the back" to which Hitler would often refer -- but also in empowering the right-wing Freikorps militias in using them to put down the Bolshevik-inspired rebellions that occurred in the same year. As historian David Blackbourn has written, however, the SPD did manage to institute several important social reforms, as well as prevent right-wing authoritarian takeovers like that in Hungary, which experienced similar left-wing revolutionary activity.[6] To that extent, although the fight against authoritarianism ultimately failed in Germany, it was successful in the short term owing to the efforts of the SPD.
=====
[1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 1584, Amazon Kindle.
[2] David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 486.
[3] Ibid, 487-89.
[4] Ibid, 491.
[5] Ibid, 492.
[6] Ibid, 493.
[1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 1584, Amazon Kindle.
[2] David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 486.
[3] Ibid, 487-89.
[4] Ibid, 491.
[5] Ibid, 492.
[6] Ibid, 493.
Wednesday, September 7, 2016
Hasty Mobilization in World War I
For Germany, a hard-learned lesson of the first year of the war was that how it interpreted the act of military mobilization was not the same as other nations' interpretations. As a result of this assumption, Germany declared war on Russia although it is not clear that Russia undertook mobilization for reasons other than preparedness in the event that a negotiated settlement to the Austrian-Serbian conflict failed. Because of Germany's declaration against Russia, the conflict truly became continent wide, with Germany's first move the violation of Belgium's neutrality and the U.K.'s entry into the war -- an action it undertook because it believed that it had to eliminate the threat of France to successfully counter Russia.
Michael Howard writes in his book on the war, "On 30 July Czar Nicholas II, with extreme hesitation, ordered the mobilization of all Russian armed forces. It was generally assumed that mobilization led inevitably to Aufmarsch, the deployment of armies for the invasion of their neighbors, and that such deployment led with equal inevitability to war."[1] On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia when the latter refused to submit to all of the demands made on it in the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Immediately, Russia undertook steps to mobilized its armed forces, seeking to protect its own interests, as well as its Orthodox Christian ally.
Canadian historian Gordon Martel has written extensively on the topic of the initial mobilization, and he emphasizes the deliberations that occurred between July 28 and the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1. For instance, Martel writes that, on July 29, "A message announcing a general mobilization in Russia had been drafted and ready to be sent out [sic] by 9 p.m. Then, just minutes before it was to be sent out, a personal messenger from the Tsar arrived, instructing that it the general mobilization be cancelled and a partial one re-instituted. The Tsar wanted to hear how the Kaiser would respond to his latest telegram before proceeding"[2]
Over the next two days, Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm volleyed back and forth over whether mobilization would mean war. The day of the war declaration, Martel notes, "Nicholas said he understood that, under the circumstances, Germany was obliged to mobilize, but he asked Wilhelm to give him the same guarantee that he had given Wilhelm: ‘that these measures DO NOT mean war’ and that they would continue to negotiate ‘for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to our hearts'." [3] Despite this assurance from the Tsar, who truly did not want war against Germany, Germany declared war the same day.
Although Martel's depiction of the negotiations is intricate, it is important to bear in mind that they occurred over only three days and not in person. A 12-hour ultimatum issued by Germany to Russia was an overly hasty act, motivated by worry among the Germans about the French-Russian alliance and concern that a two-front war would be impossible to fight. Thus, in the mistaken belief that France could be easily knocked out of the war, particularly if the U.K. hesitated to intervene, Germany forced the hand of Russia and mobilized against Belgium, forcing the U.K.'s hand as well. The length of Germany's campaign in the west was far longer than expected, and Germany ended up getting the two-front war it sought to avoid.
=====
[1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 626.
[2] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Wednesday, 29 July 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/07/29-july-1914-russian-mobilization-first-world-war/#sthash.JHq57BWe.dpuf
[3] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Saturday, 1 August 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/08/1-august-1914-germany-declares-war-on-russia/#sthash.pZxmFsiY.dpuf
Michael Howard writes in his book on the war, "On 30 July Czar Nicholas II, with extreme hesitation, ordered the mobilization of all Russian armed forces. It was generally assumed that mobilization led inevitably to Aufmarsch, the deployment of armies for the invasion of their neighbors, and that such deployment led with equal inevitability to war."[1] On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia when the latter refused to submit to all of the demands made on it in the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Immediately, Russia undertook steps to mobilized its armed forces, seeking to protect its own interests, as well as its Orthodox Christian ally.
Canadian historian Gordon Martel has written extensively on the topic of the initial mobilization, and he emphasizes the deliberations that occurred between July 28 and the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1. For instance, Martel writes that, on July 29, "A message announcing a general mobilization in Russia had been drafted and ready to be sent out [sic] by 9 p.m. Then, just minutes before it was to be sent out, a personal messenger from the Tsar arrived, instructing that it the general mobilization be cancelled and a partial one re-instituted. The Tsar wanted to hear how the Kaiser would respond to his latest telegram before proceeding"[2]
Over the next two days, Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm volleyed back and forth over whether mobilization would mean war. The day of the war declaration, Martel notes, "Nicholas said he understood that, under the circumstances, Germany was obliged to mobilize, but he asked Wilhelm to give him the same guarantee that he had given Wilhelm: ‘that these measures DO NOT mean war’ and that they would continue to negotiate ‘for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to our hearts'." [3] Despite this assurance from the Tsar, who truly did not want war against Germany, Germany declared war the same day.
Although Martel's depiction of the negotiations is intricate, it is important to bear in mind that they occurred over only three days and not in person. A 12-hour ultimatum issued by Germany to Russia was an overly hasty act, motivated by worry among the Germans about the French-Russian alliance and concern that a two-front war would be impossible to fight. Thus, in the mistaken belief that France could be easily knocked out of the war, particularly if the U.K. hesitated to intervene, Germany forced the hand of Russia and mobilized against Belgium, forcing the U.K.'s hand as well. The length of Germany's campaign in the west was far longer than expected, and Germany ended up getting the two-front war it sought to avoid.
=====
[1] Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York, Oxford UP, 2007), 626.
[2] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Wednesday, 29 July 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/07/29-july-1914-russian-mobilization-first-world-war/#sthash.JHq57BWe.dpuf
[3] Gordon Martel, "The month that changed the world: Saturday, 1 August 1914," OUPblog, accessed September 1, 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2014/08/1-august-1914-germany-declares-war-on-russia/#sthash.pZxmFsiY.dpuf
Thursday, June 23, 2016
Colonialism During the Belle Époque
Here's my first forum post from the next course: Modern European History.
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The popular militarism of the Belle Époque is broadly expressed in cultural texts from the period. For the readings for the week, this militarism is expressed within the context of colonialism, but more specifically, the readings provide hints of the conflicts that will arise for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia over the course of the coming decades. Britain already ruled the seas and, by extension, an enormous empire by the Belle Époque, and its military supremacy would persist until it was supplanted by the United States during World War II. Russia and Germany, as relative latecomers to the "great game," saw their imperial destines lying in the east, although the specifics were different and their interests overlapped.
=====
The popular militarism of the Belle Époque is broadly expressed in cultural texts from the period. For the readings for the week, this militarism is expressed within the context of colonialism, but more specifically, the readings provide hints of the conflicts that will arise for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia over the course of the coming decades. Britain already ruled the seas and, by extension, an enormous empire by the Belle Époque, and its military supremacy would persist until it was supplanted by the United States during World War II. Russia and Germany, as relative latecomers to the "great game," saw their imperial destines lying in the east, although the specifics were different and their interests overlapped.
A common theme
uniting the imperialistic anthems of the United Kingdom is that of divineright. Repeatedly in the songs excerpted in the reading are references to the
imprimatur of God on Britain's colonial endeavors. This expression is perhaps
most clear in "God Save the Queen," here referring to Victoria, under
whose reign the empire reached nearly its greatest extent. More explicitly,
"Land of Hope and Glory" in more than one line, addressing Britain,
says that God has "made thee mighty,"[1] with the direct statement
that the borders of the empire will be expanded with God's approval
("Wider still and wider / shall thy bounds be set").[2] The
association between the imperial enterprise and divine favoritism comes to full
fruition in "Jerusalem," with the United Kingdom cast in Blake's
lyrics as so good a defender of Christendom that Britain approaches Biblical
Jerusalem in its holiness.
The excerpt by
Prince Ukhtomskii of Russia, written when the author accompanied the future
Tsar Nicholas II on a diplomatic voyage to the Far East, is no less explicit in
expressing a unique place for Russia in the family of nations, although
unsurprisingly, the specifics of Russia's geopolitical role are quite
different. Most importantly, the militarism of Ukhtomskii's thoughts often seem
directed less toward those whom he sees as potential imperial subjects and more
toward the European nations that have already colonized Indonesia (the Netherlands) and Indochina (France). He excoriates the greed and racism of
European colonialists: "The natives are not brothers in humanity to them;
for them the land is one of voluntary exile, and the people are considered as
miserable and inferior beings."[3] Russia, owing to its massive
intercontinental geography is different, Ukhtomskii maintains, not only in its
greater respect for the people of Asia, but more importantly also in the esteem
that Asians feel for Russia and its "White Tsar."[4] Unspoken but
underlying the acknowledgement of Russia's particular role in Asian imperial
rule is impending conflict with Japan, hinting toward the conflict with that
country that Russia would fight less than twenty years later.
Friedrich von
Bernhardi's Germany and the Next War was
published in 1912 and is thus the latest of the readings for the week, as well
as closest to World War I. Bernhardi's point of view is the clearest expression
of Social Darwinism and the military conflict necessary for the further
"evolution" of European civilization: "War is a biological
necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind
which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will
follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real
civilization."[5] In referring immediately before this passage to the
Hague Peace Conference, Bernhardi seems to be suggesting that European conflict
must be waged within certain restrictions, unlike Germany's recent colonial
endeavors in present-day Namibia.[6] Nevertheless, it is clear that Bernhardi
sees war as an important aspect of European development. Within the context of
both the completed division of Africa among European powers at the Berlin
Conference in 1885 and Bismarck's Drang nachOsten (drive toward the east), in so far as major conflict going forward
will be largely imperial in nature, Germany's conflicts will be with Russia, as
the war to come would show.
Thus,
the readings from British, Russian, and German writers all engage the topics of
militarism via colonialism, but the dimensions of the topics are
country-specific. Britain envisions continued military supremacy and an
ever-growing empire. Russia sees a manifest destiny of hegemony over Asia, with
the realization that such supremacy must be maintained, if not imposed,
militarily. Germany believes that militarism and the war that it engenders is a
positive process and an innate human need, and its recent geopolitical
posturing indicates that it sees its imperial and colonial future in Eastern
Europe, under the concept of Lebensraum
(living space). That these three countries' paths would greatly diverge in the
coming decades is clear, but perhaps the readings will provide some indication
of why they did.
======
[1] "British Imperialistic Anthems:
Rule Britannia and Land of Hope and Glory, and more," Modern History
Sourcebook, accessed June 12, 2016, http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/rulebritannia.asp
[2] Ibid.
[3] E.E. Ukhtomsky, "Prince
Ukhtomskii: Russia's Imperial Destiny, 1891," Modern History
Sourcebook, accessed June 12, 2016, http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1891ukhtomskii.asp,
para. 6.
[4] Ibid, para. 7.
[5] Friedrich
von Bernhardi, Germany and
the Next War, translated by Allen H. Powles,
accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.gwpda.org/comment/bernhardi.html,
chapter 1, para 7.
[6] George Steinmetz, "The First Genocide of the 20th Century and its
Postcolonial Afterlives: Germany and the Namibian Ovaherero," Journal of the International Institute 12, no. 2 (Winter 2005): http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0012.201/--first-genocide-of-the-20th-century-and-its-postcolonial?rgn=main;view=fulltext;q1=Race+and+Ethnicity
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