While I am unsure whether there was such a thing as "Khrushchevism," I am certain that it is wrong to equate the Khrushchev era with De-Stalinization. The clearest argument against De-Stalinization" under Khrushchev is the re-emergence of Stalinist policies once Khrushchev was removed from office. A closer look at the ideological politics of Khrushchev's tenure can shed some light on this confusion of terms.
It is tempting to link De-Stalinization with Khrushchev because of the latter's "secret speech" at the CPSU congress in 1956 and its denunciation of his predecessor's cult of personality and crimes. However, it ought not be forgotten that Khrushchev was an active participant in these crimes, particularly when he was first secretary in Ukraine during the 1930s. As Miriam Dobson writes, "condemning Stalin and the terror compelled society to rethink the way it understood its own recent, and very bloody, past—and by extension how people were now to relate to their own life stories."[1] In the case of Khrushchev, such a meditation would require him to review his own personal actions.
Beyond the issue of personal responsibility, Khrushchev also knew that he could not allow the "thaw" that accompanied the speech to become too warm, as doing so would endanger his own position as general secretary and de facto ruler of the country. Quoting Aleksei Adzhubei, William Taubman writes, "Khrushchev sensed the blow had been too powerful, and . . . increasingly he sought to limit the boundaries of critical analysis, lest it end up polarising society."[2] Taubman links the crushing of the Hungarian uprising to the unwanted effects of greater openness. That Khrushchev chose to crush it rather than take a moderate approach demonstrates the extent to which De-Stalinization was a form of cover that Khrushchev provided himself so that, whatever he did, the crimes of Stalin would appear worse.
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[1] Miriam Dobson, "The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent," Kritika, 12, no. 4 (2011): 907.
[2] William Taubman, "The Khrushchev Period, 1953-1964," in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Roland Suny (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 270.
It is tempting to link De-Stalinization with Khrushchev because of the latter's "secret speech" at the CPSU congress in 1956 and its denunciation of his predecessor's cult of personality and crimes. However, it ought not be forgotten that Khrushchev was an active participant in these crimes, particularly when he was first secretary in Ukraine during the 1930s. As Miriam Dobson writes, "condemning Stalin and the terror compelled society to rethink the way it understood its own recent, and very bloody, past—and by extension how people were now to relate to their own life stories."[1] In the case of Khrushchev, such a meditation would require him to review his own personal actions.
Beyond the issue of personal responsibility, Khrushchev also knew that he could not allow the "thaw" that accompanied the speech to become too warm, as doing so would endanger his own position as general secretary and de facto ruler of the country. Quoting Aleksei Adzhubei, William Taubman writes, "Khrushchev sensed the blow had been too powerful, and . . . increasingly he sought to limit the boundaries of critical analysis, lest it end up polarising society."[2] Taubman links the crushing of the Hungarian uprising to the unwanted effects of greater openness. That Khrushchev chose to crush it rather than take a moderate approach demonstrates the extent to which De-Stalinization was a form of cover that Khrushchev provided himself so that, whatever he did, the crimes of Stalin would appear worse.
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[1] Miriam Dobson, "The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent," Kritika, 12, no. 4 (2011): 907.
[2] William Taubman, "The Khrushchev Period, 1953-1964," in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Roland Suny (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 270.
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