Red Victory in the Russian Civil War

It would be disastrously reductive to assume that any single factor contributed more than any other to the Red Army winning the Russian Civil War. Different historians with different ideologies will necessarily take different views regarding this question. However, if the war was most bitterly fought and for the longest time in the westernmost reaches of the Russian Empire, particularly in Ukraine and Poland, then ultimately I think a combination of military, ethnic, and terroristic factors contributed most to Soviet victory.

On the first point, the textbook makes the point well that fighting on widely separated fronts made it difficult for the White Armies to mount offensives with long-term results.[1] On the other side of the battlefield(s), that the Soviets were encircled within the great Russian heartland actually facilitated a more successful defense earlier in the war, with a smaller, constrained theater of operations allowing for greater maneuverability. As M.K. Dziewanowski points out, many Red Army veterans were deployed several times.[2]

Related to this first point is the second point of ethnic factors. Again, as noted in the textbook, the White Army generals, being generally insensitive to the feelings and concerns of non-Russian ethnic groups, lost vital support as a result of vocally assuring Russian supremacy in the event of a White victory.[3] Given the importance of the most ethnically diverse areas of the Empire to a White victory, such rhetoric was a crucial mistake, although it bears mentioning here that the Soviets did not have anything better to offer non-Russians besides the notion of an end to repression as the result of a society rid of religious and ethnic division on the basis of socialism.

Finally, the use of terror was important to both sides, although with different end results. On the one hand, the infliction of ethnic violence by White Armies, particularly in the form of pogroms against Jews residing in the old Pale of Settlement, guaranteed that the sympathies of some minorities would fall to the Bolsheviks, at least in the short term.[4] On the other hand, the pervasive use of terror by the Red Army no doubt played a role in obtaining compliance from the population at large in areas under its control.

Regarding the factors emphasized by different schools of thought, totalitarians have typically been fond of emphasizing the Red Terror as a key factor in Soviet victory. Given the totalitarian emphasis on the most negative aspects of Soviet rule, not to mention Daniel Pipes's de-emphasis of the agency of workers and peasants in the rise of Soviet rule,[5] it is unsurprising that this extremely negative policy of the Red Army should receive attention, although it bears mention that the Soviets were not alone in employing terror. In contrast, being far more likely to consider workers and peasants as fundamentally important actors in the revolutionary process, the revisionists are more likely to emphasize economic matters, making the argument that the Soviets' promise of economic equality motivated and mobilized support for the Red Army. Again, the truth likely lies somewhere between these beliefs.

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[1] M.K. Dziewanowski, Russia in the Twentieth Century, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson, 2003), 107-08.
[2] Ibid, 114.
[3] Ibid, 108.
[4] The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, online edition, s.v. "Russian Civil war," accessed April 21, 2016,http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/russian_civil_war, para. 3 ff.
[5] Richard Pipes, "Reflections on the Russian Revolution," Alexander Palace Time Machine, accessed April 10, 2016,http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/pipesrevolution.html, paras. 13 and 14.

Source Analysis: Lenin's Rise to Power

That V.I. Lenin left behind volumes of his own writings is helpful in determining his justifications for his historic actions. For example, two of his essays, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," from April 1917, also known as the "April Theses,"[1] and "Theses on the Constituent Assembly"[2] from six months later, help to determine Lenin's thinking in the period from the March Revolution that removed the tsar and established a parliamentary republic and the Bolshevik seizure of power in November. By examining the two texts in juxtaposition with each other, it is possible to determine the reasons for Lenin's decision to embrace extremism by eliminating parliamentary democracy during the first few months of Soviet rule, including the continuing war, the difficulties inherent in minority status, and his observations of the Marxist theory of revolution unfolding at an expedited pace.

In the "April Thesis," Lenin writes, "I attacked the Provisional Government for not having appointed an early date or any date at all, for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and for confining itself to promises."[3] He goes on to remind his reader that he merely argued that such an assembly would not work in the absence of workers' councils (i.e., Soviets) to represent workers and soldiers. In offering his argument for such a position, the first topic he broaches is the ongoing war against the Central Powers. In Lenin's view, the continuation of the "predatory imperialist war"[4] was being undertaken the provisional government. Because the parties that would participate in elections to the Constituent Assembly would be bourgeois parties, Lenin emphasizes the need to counterbalance the assembly with Soviets that represent the proletariat.

However, once the Bolsheviks have seized power and he promulgates his "Theses on the Constituent Assembly," Lenin is satisfied to nullify the results of the election to the Constituent Assembly, arguing, "Only now are the broad sections of the people actually receiving a chance fully and openly to observe the policy of revolutionary struggle for peace and to study its results."[5] Because the "mass of the people" did not realize this possibility at the time of the elections, he argues, the Bolsheviks must be given the opportunity to express the will of the people. In explaining Lenin's point of view, Orlando Figes seizes on Point 13 of the "Theses on the Constituent Assembly," which argues that the October Revolution had "shifted mass opinion to the left since the election."[6] Ironically, the Bolsheviks would resort to using force to impose this "mass opinion."

Lenin also argued at first for the combined presence of a Constituent Assembly and People's Soviets in recognition that the Bolsheviks were a minority party, even within the Soviets themselves. In the "April Theses," he writes, "in most of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies our Party is in a minority, so far a small minority, as against a bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements."[7] He concedes that, as a minority, the Bolsheviks must focus their efforts on propagandizing the working class "so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience."[8] All the while, Lenin makes it clear in the "April Theses" that the long-term goal would not be a parliamentary democracy but a Soviet republic.

Once he had seized power, however, Lenin was happy to impose minority rule. Robert Mayer writes that, at least in part, Lenin was willing to take revolutionary action only once the Bolsheviks had gained majority control over the soviets in Petrograd and Moscow. He "claimed a majority mandate within the proletariat for the October Revolution, and he justified Bolshevik rule thereafter on [that] basis."[9] To Mayer, this decision amounts to a rejection of previous denunciations by Lenin of Blanquism,[10] at least on a national level, as well as the expression of his willingness to impose a Tocqueville-esque "tyranny of the majority" on the Soviets themselves.[11]

Finally, in accepting the calls for a Constituent Assembly in the "April Theses," Lenin seems to embrace the orthodox Marxist notion of a two-stage revolution, according to which a bourgeois-democratic revolution must precede the proletarian revolution that seizes power for the working classes. In the "Theses on the Constituent Assembly," however, Lenin argues that the bourgeois-democratic state must be smashed a mere six months into its life cycle and mere weeks after elections to its parliament. To many readers, this shift represents the greatest transformation in Lenin's thinking, if not outright hypocrisy.

Jonathan Frankel has argued, however, that assuming a radical shift in theory or hypocrisy on Lenin's part is too hasty. Rather, at least from Lenin's other writings, Frankel summarizes Lenin's view as one that "the revolution had gone much farther than anticipated and control of the state had already passed from the feudal to the bourgeois class (in the form of the Provisional Government."[12] In short, even before elections to the Constituent Assembly had been called, Russia had already achieved bourgeois-democratic status. Once "the actual power of the Soviets was so immense that they in fact constituted (albeit in passive form) the long-awaited dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry,"[13] presumably on the basis of Bolshevik majorities, at least in Petrograd and Moscow, it would be a betrayal of the revolution to revert to a parliamentary state.

In conclusion, reading the two sets of theses by Lenin provides an opportunity for insight into his decisions during 1917. The continuation of World War I by the Provisional Government was a major reason for Lenin’s rejection thereof, and he feared the Bolsheviks had not been able to mobilize public opinion against the war before the elections to the Constituent Assembly occurred. Moreover, the Bolsheviks remains a minority party throughout 1917, despite gains in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets. Although Lenin’s decision to dismiss the Constituent Assembly and establish a Soviet dictatorship can appear hypocritical, it was also the pace of events over the course of the year that large affected his change in tactics.

Bibliography

Figes, Orlando. Revolutionary Russia. Accessed April 15, 2016. http://www.            revolutionaryrussia.com/

Frankel, Jonathan. “Lenin’s Doctrinal Revolution of April 1917.” Contemporary History,

            4, no. 2 (1969): 117-142.

Lenin, V.I. "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution." Translated by Isaacs

Bernard. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/
1917/apr/04.htm

Lenin, V.I. "Theses on the Constituent Assembly." Translated by Yuri Sdobnikov and

George Hanna. Accessed April 15, 2016. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/
works/1917/dec/11a.htm

Mayer, Robert. “Lenin, the Proletariat, and the Legitimation of Dictatorship.” Journal of

            Political Ideologies, 2, no. 1 (1997): 99-115. doi: 10.1080/13569319708420752.

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[1] V.I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," trans. Isaacs Bernard, accessed April 15, 2016, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm

[2] V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the Constituent Assembly," trans. Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna, accessed April 15, 2016, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/dec/11a.htm

[3] Lenin, “Tasks,” point 10, para. 9.

[4] Ibid, point 1, para. 1.

[5] Lenin, “Theses,” point 15, para. 2.

[6] Orlando Figes, “Section 6: The October Revolution 1917,” Revolutionary Russia, accessed April 15, 2016, http://www.revolutionaryrussia.com/section6_TheOctoberRevolution1917/TheConstituentAssembly.php, para. 5.

[7] Lenin, “Tasks,” point 4, para. 1.

[8] Ibid, point 4, para. 3.

[9] Robert Mayer, “Lenin, the Proletariat, and the Legitimation of Dictatorship,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 2, no. 1 (1997): para. 18, doi: 10.1080/13569319708420752

[10] Ibid, para. 17.

[11] Ibid, para. 15.

[12] Jonathan Frankel, “Lenin’s Doctrinal Revolution of April 1917,” Contemporary History, 4, no. 2 (1969): 127.

[13] Ibid.

Russian Historiography: Totalitarianism vs Revisionism

Back to school! Here's my first discussion post for my Modern Russia class.

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Having read the textbook chapters for the week and the readings by Alice Gomstyn and Richard Pipes, as well as having very recently read J. Arch Getty's two books on the Great Purges, I have come to the conclusion that both the totalitarian and revisionist schools of thought on Soviet history have strengths, but they are both more characterized by weaknesses. Like many cases in which schools of thought operate at odds with each other, it is more likely that the truth lies somewhere between their respective versions.

The chief strength of the totalitarian school is its authority. As the older of the two schools, it benefits from the greater longevity of the narrative that it has established. Its primary weakness, in my opinion, is that it owes too much to the "Great Man" theory of history of Thomas Carlyle,[1] with the man in question in this case being Stalin. While it is attractive to see Stalin as exercising complete control over the fate of the Soviet Union during his rule, it is also likely overly simplistic. The chief strength of the revisionist school is its recognition of the contributions of complex forces in the unfolding of historical events. Its primary weakness, perhaps unsurprisingly, is the extent to which it de-emphasizes Stalin's historical role, highlighting instead the contributions of regional party leaders and local elites in processes of repression, for instance.

Those things said, there does remain some relevance for both schools of thought. For instance, the totalitarians have been largely vindicated by the publication of the Venona project decrypts having revealed the extent of Soviet espionage. Additionally, as Gomstyn points out, much of the material from the archives has largely their suspicions that repression in the USSR was widespread and deeply resented by the people. The totalitarian viewpoint thus remains valid for largely moral reasons, although as Gomstyn also notes, this moralizing can be reductive, e.g., the labeling of Getty by Martin Malia as engaging in a form of denial.[2] In contrast, the emphasis by the revisionists of Soviet scientific achievement, avoids throwing out the baby with the bath water, so to speak, although it does run firmly up against the totalitarian view that the ends do not justify the means. Thus, the revisionist viewpoint remains relevant in part for the same reason why we do not avoid building divided highways, although it was the Nazis that introduced them.

Regarding the article by Pipes, it become clear relatively early in reading it that he comes from the totalitarian school. He chalks up the weaknesses of Nicholas II's reign to the tsar's inability to adjust to the economic growth of the country and the social changes they wrought.[3] In emphasizing the tsar's role in his own downfall, Pipes simultaneously de-emphasizes the role of the people, choosing instead to hang blame on a radical intelligentsia and a peasantry unable and unwilling to adapt to industrialization. In this way, Pipes evokes a "great man" theory based on Nicholas II, while dismissing or denying more complex social-historical forces.

The counter-arguments against Pipes are offered at least in part in the textbook. For instance, Dziewanowski is able to substantiate the claim of an angry and alienated peasantry by emphasizing, as Pipes does not, that with emancipation of the serfs came a series of new problems not the least of which was binding them to the village commune and to land captains. While Pipes is satisfied to dismiss the peasants' desire for further reforms are greed for land,[5] Dziewanowski is more willing to entertain a more nuanced interpretation of the peasants' situation that fueled their concerns. While I do not whether Dziewanowski would consider herself a revisionist, it is clear, at least from this week's readings, that she is not a totalitarian.

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   [1] Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (London: Chapman and Hall, 1840),https://books.google.com/books?id=kCo-AAAAYAAJ

   [2] Alice Gomstyn, "Where the Cold War Still Rages," Chronicle of Higher Education 50, no. 22 (2004): para. 7,http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/docview/214684560?accountid=3783

   [3] Richard Pipes, "Reflections on the Russian Revolution," Alexander Palace Time Machine, accessed April 10, 2016,http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/pipesrevolution.html, para. 23.

   [4] M.K. Dziewanowski, Russia in the Twentieth Century, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson, 2003), 43-44.

   [5] Pipes, ibid, para. 10.