Failure of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia

5.2. Why has the post-Soviet space not democratized?

To some extent, I think, to recognize why the post-Soviet space has not democratized, it's necessary to recognize why other places have. The so-called Western democracies democratized slowly over the course of decades if not hundreds of years, so it's perhaps fair to ask whether we might not have to wait a similar period of time before democratization really happens elsewhere. In addition, it is important to examine where democracy has succeeded and failed elsewhere in the world, e.g., in some parts of Latin America (Chile and Uruguay, for examples) and in the Middle East, respectively. In the end, I think it is a combination of economics and security concerns that has prevented full democratization in the post-Soviet area. 

On the former point, those countries that did democratize, whether in the tradition of the Western nations or the later cases in Latin America, did so within an environment of relative economic health. While it is a foregone conclusion that bad economic times can cause people to abandon democracy, it might be less obvious that economic stability can foster greater democratization. In the case of the post-Soviet space, the economic situation has not been great since 1991. Although there was obvious economic growth during the 1990s, it went mostly to the top levels, where it increased wealth inequality, rather than the growth being distributed more evenly among income groups. This pattern of growth was especially true in Russia. Since 2001, energy crises due to 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism and the 2008 global economic crisis both negatively affected even those economics that had done well during the 1990s, with the result of democratization, slow as it might have been, being reversed and authoritarianism re-asserted. 

On the latter point, Plato asserted 2,500 years ago that tyrannical rule emerged out of democracy yielding chaos and that tyrants went to war to consolidate their regimes. While the comparison to contemporary authoritarian regimes is less than perfect, it is nevertheless true that serious security concerns have arisen in many of the post-Soviet states, with the result that a decreased emphasis on diversity of opinion has been the result. For instance, where ethnic conflicts have emerged, e.g., between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, there has been stunted democracy and the re-emergence of authoritarianism. To some extent, have a history of being victims of genocide has facilitated this reaction among Armenians; the sense of being besieged probably contributes to this phenomenon among Azeris. In a larger sense, concerns about Islamic fundamentalist violence could fuel security concerns in Central Asia and, during the 1990s, in Russia itself. It is more likely that Russia and Russian-aligned states fear the United States militarily and that those states pulling away from Russia fear Russia seeking to re-establish (neo-)colonial rule on the basis of protecting ethnically Russian populations. The specific fears are different on the two sides of the border, but the end result of resurgent authoritarianism is shared.

Why Did the USSR Collapse?

5.1 Is the collapse of the USSR more attributable to personality, institutional or structural features?

I think the collapse of the USSR was attributable to all three of the features: personality, institutional, and structural. Presuming that Mikhail Gorbachev is the person referred to in the first regard, I think it's fair to say that his personality played an essential role in the country's collapse, although obviously it's more difficult to say whether the dismantling of the Soviet state was by design or an unintended consequence of reform. Here, the readings for the week offer a range of viewpoints. David Marples's analysis is particularly useful in pointing out how, on the one hand, Gorbachev had risen through the ranks of the party into the elite with the paradoxical effect that "Neither workers, nor peasants, nor the intellectual elite accepted him as one of their own."[1] While such a characterization might initially seem to constitute a handicap, I rather think the lack of personal connections allowed Gorbachev to have a sort of maneuverability that a leader more attached to the party (e.g., Brezhnev) or to the workers and peasants (e.g., Khrushchev) might not have had. At those times where the wisdom of Gorbachev's decisions faltered (such as in the Lithuanian crisis early in 1991), he was probably saved more by luck than ability, but outside of the last year of his tenure, I don't think was the overarching style of Gorbachev's leadership.

Regarding institutional features, the diminishing role of the party probably plays the most important role. Here, in ultimately excluding the party from an exclusive role as the single guiding party of the system, Gorbachev delivered a coup de grace to a system that had been deteriorating over at least two decades. As Alexander Dallin points out, although the party grew to a heavily bureaucratized state with deeply entrenched control by the dawn of the Brezhnev era, the stagnation of that era resulted in a fundamental disconnect between the people and the party, made worse by rampant corruption. When the glasnost policy brought all of these problems out into the open, Dallin writes, "all this brought about a remarkable sense of having been lied to, of having been deprived of what the rest of the world had had access to […] a transformation of the Communist Party from the unchallenged clan of privilege to a hollow institution without a rational task other than self-preservations."[2] With glasnost in place, there could not help but be a vicious cycle of openness evoking party delegitimization evoking more openness, etc. Without the guiding hand of the party over the party state, the state could not but help but dissolve.

Finally, the structural features are most complex of all, involving both the rise of nationalism and the dissolution of totalitarianism. On the former point, a two-faced minorities policy that for decades had preached local self-determination but practiced aggressive Russification could not have helped but fuel nationalism, everything we know about nationalism considered. Regarding the latter point, I found Rasma Karklins's essay most helpful. As she notes, "If one links the totalitarian model's assumptions about the significance of the party's ideological and media monopolies to a dynamic concept of political culture, the erosion of these monopolies reveals itself as even more of a systemic change."[3] Karklins is clear that the roles of personality, ideology, and institutions are interrelated in her essay, so she bears in mind Gorbachev's role of instituting democratization "from above" and his dilution of the party's key role. Overall, I found her analysis to be the most incisive.

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[1] David R. Marples, The Collapse of the Soviet Union 1985-1991 (New York: Routledge, 2015), 103.
[2] Alexander Dallin, "Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Post-Soviet Affairs, 8, no. 4 (1992): 298.
[3] Rasma Karklins, "Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union," Europe-Asia Studies, 46, no. 1 (1994): 34.

Brezhnevism or Neo-Stalinism?

4.2.3. Is there such a thing as Brezhnevism? What, if anything, characterises the ideological politics of Brezhnev's long term in office?

There is such a thing has Brezhnevism, but I don't think Brezhnevism is the right word to use for it. On the one hand, there certainly was a series of policies and actions undertaken by the Soviet government between 1964 and 1982. On the other hand, whether it is correct to apply Brezhnev's name to these policies and actions seems to be to rely on the extent to which Brezhnev contributed to these policies or whether they would have been pursued if he had not been the leader of the USSR during this period.

If there is one aspect of Brezhnevism that seems initially indisputable, it is the Brezhnev Doctrine of armed intervention to prevent the overthrow of socialist governments in Eastern Europe. No better example of this doctrine in action exists than the Soviet and Warsaw Pact deployment of tanks to Czechoslovakia to put down the so-called Prague Spring. However, the decision to intervene in Prague does not seem to have been Brezhnev's call. For instance, in his discussion of the topic, Stephen Hanson mentions not Brezhnev's concern but Kosygin's, even as he refers to the consequent doctrine promulgated in the general secretary's name to be "Brezhnevian orthodoxy."[1]

The explanation for this focus on Kosygin is given by Richard Sawka, who notes the emphasis during the Brezhnev era on collective leadership. Sawka writes that Brezhnev was "dour and (mindful of his predecessor's fate) sought to rule by consensus."[2] Thus, if there was a Brezhnevism, understood as the body of decisions made by the Soviet leadership when Brezhnev was general secretary, it seems unfair to tag this period with his name, despite his status as first among equals with the CPSU leadership.

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[1] Stephen E. Hanson, "The Brezhnev Era," in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Roland Suny (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 300.
[2] Richard Sawka, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (New York: Routledge, 1999), 351.

Was Khrushchevism a Period of De-Stalinization?

4.1.3. It is sometimes suggested that historians ought to swap the term "De-Stalinisation" for Khrushchevism. What do you think? Is there such a thing as ‘Khrushchevism’? Can more insight into the transition from Stalinism be gained by focusing on what was distinctive about the ideological politics of the Khrushchev era?

While I am unsure whether there was such a thing as "Khrushchevism," I am certain that it is wrong to equate the Khrushchev era with De-Stalinization. The clearest argument against De-Stalinization" under Khrushchev is the re-emergence of Stalinist policies once Khrushchev was removed from office. A closer look at the ideological politics of Khrushchev's tenure can shed some light on this confusion of terms.

It is tempting to link De-Stalinization with Khrushchev because of the latter's "secret speech" at the CPSU congress in 1956 and its denunciation of his predecessor's cult of personality and crimes. However, it ought not be forgotten that Khrushchev was an active participant in these crimes, particularly when he was first secretary in Ukraine during the 1930s. As Miriam Dobson writes, "condemning Stalin and the terror compelled society to rethink the way it understood its own recent, and very bloody, past—and by extension how people were now to relate to their own life stories."[1] In the case of Khrushchev, such a meditation would require him to review his own personal actions.

Beyond the issue of personal responsibility, Khrushchev also knew that he could not allow the "thaw" that accompanied the speech to become too warm, as doing so would endanger his own position as general secretary and de facto ruler of the country. Quoting Aleksei Adzhubei, William Taubman writes, "Khrushchev sensed the blow had been too powerful, and . . . increasingly he sought to limit the boundaries of critical analysis, lest it end up polarising society."[2] Taubman links the crushing of the Hungarian uprising to the unwanted effects of greater openness. That Khrushchev chose to crush it rather than take a moderate approach demonstrates the extent to which De-Stalinization was a form of cover that Khrushchev provided himself so that, whatever he did, the crimes of Stalin would appear worse.

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[1] Miriam Dobson, "The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent," Kritika, 12, no. 4 (2011): 907.
[2] William Taubman, "The Khrushchev Period, 1953-1964," in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Roland Suny (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 270.