Was Khrushchevism a Period of De-Stalinization?

4.1.3. It is sometimes suggested that historians ought to swap the term "De-Stalinisation" for Khrushchevism. What do you think? Is there such a thing as ‘Khrushchevism’? Can more insight into the transition from Stalinism be gained by focusing on what was distinctive about the ideological politics of the Khrushchev era?

While I am unsure whether there was such a thing as "Khrushchevism," I am certain that it is wrong to equate the Khrushchev era with De-Stalinization. The clearest argument against De-Stalinization" under Khrushchev is the re-emergence of Stalinist policies once Khrushchev was removed from office. A closer look at the ideological politics of Khrushchev's tenure can shed some light on this confusion of terms.

It is tempting to link De-Stalinization with Khrushchev because of the latter's "secret speech" at the CPSU congress in 1956 and its denunciation of his predecessor's cult of personality and crimes. However, it ought not be forgotten that Khrushchev was an active participant in these crimes, particularly when he was first secretary in Ukraine during the 1930s. As Miriam Dobson writes, "condemning Stalin and the terror compelled society to rethink the way it understood its own recent, and very bloody, past—and by extension how people were now to relate to their own life stories."[1] In the case of Khrushchev, such a meditation would require him to review his own personal actions.

Beyond the issue of personal responsibility, Khrushchev also knew that he could not allow the "thaw" that accompanied the speech to become too warm, as doing so would endanger his own position as general secretary and de facto ruler of the country. Quoting Aleksei Adzhubei, William Taubman writes, "Khrushchev sensed the blow had been too powerful, and . . . increasingly he sought to limit the boundaries of critical analysis, lest it end up polarising society."[2] Taubman links the crushing of the Hungarian uprising to the unwanted effects of greater openness. That Khrushchev chose to crush it rather than take a moderate approach demonstrates the extent to which De-Stalinization was a form of cover that Khrushchev provided himself so that, whatever he did, the crimes of Stalin would appear worse.

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[1] Miriam Dobson, "The Post-Stalin Era: De-Stalinization, Daily Life, and Dissent," Kritika, 12, no. 4 (2011): 907.
[2] William Taubman, "The Khrushchev Period, 1953-1964," in Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 3, edited by Roland Suny (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 270.

Stalinism Without Stalin

In the "Secret Speech" from the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev seems to want to both expose Stalinism for its worst excesses and maintain Stalinism, at least ideologically. In some ways, this complex stance exemplifies Khrushchev's own strengths and weaknesses. On the former point, the selection from the speech is replete with direct attacks on Stalin, so virtually any excerpt could be chosen at random to provide an example. In his own administration, Khrushchev sought to undo the greater censorship and emphasis on Socialist Realism that characterized Stalin's regime. An example relevant to this week's readings is the allowing of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich to be published in 1962 – an event that demonstrated both an easing of censorship and a deviation from the prescribed literary form.[1] 

On the latter point of continuing Stalinism without Stalin, Khrushchev says in the speech that Stalin "played a positive role" by eliminating the Left and Right Oppositions and opposing nationalism, writing, "This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie."[2] On the point of nationalism, this is a false statement – Stalin encouraged nationalism, provided it was Russian nationalism. On the point of the opposition blocs led by Trotsky and Bukharin, the point is equally devious because Khrushchev was as ignorant of the role of the peasantry in the Soviet state as the leaders who preceded him, despite his peasant origins. Finally, Khrushchev was no more dedicated to "socialism in one state" than Stalin himself; like Stalin, Khrushchev pursued aggressive policies within the Soviet sphere of influence (e.g., intervention in East Germany and Hungary) and sought to export Soviet communism (his courting of Castro). Perhaps the key point here is that Khrushchev's expressions of support of Stalinist policy were as sincere as Stalin's own support – which is to say not very sincere. 

As already noted, the mere fact that Solzhenitsyn's work was published openly in the 1960s in the Soviet Union was emblematic of the liberalization and relaxation of censorship under Khrushchev. By 1974, under Brezhnev, the trend had reversed sufficiently that Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the country. If the content of the "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" is an indication, his expulsion was due in part to his criticism of not only Stalin or Stalin's version of Marxism but of Marxism in general. For instance, he writes, "Marxism is not only not accurate, is not only not a science, has not only failed to predict a single event in terms of figures, quantities, time-scales or locations … it absolutely astounds one by the economic  and mechanistic  crudity of its attempts to explain that most subtle of creatures, the human being."[3] 

With regard to Andrei Sakharov's critique from the same period, he seems to limit himself largely to criticisms specifically of Stalin and of abuses that are not inherent to Marxism. He makes many direct comparisons between Stalin and Hitler, for instance, but only rarely mentions socialism. When he does, he accuses Stalin of using Hitler's demagogy on a basis of "progressive, scientific, and popular socialist ideology"[4] after already having established the "lofty moral ideals of socialism."[5] Unlike Solzhenitsyn, he does not attack the ideology lying at the core of the state. Therefore, it seems as if there was liberalization in matters of freedom of expression following the death of Stalin – with more freedom under Khrushchev than under Brezhnev, it should be noted – but that there were still "third rails" that had to be left alone, the communist system and ideology chief among them. 

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     [1] M.K. Dzeiwanowski, Russia in the Twentieth Century, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 323. 

     [2] Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech to the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U.," Accessed May 15, 2016,https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24-abs.htm, para 8. 

     [3] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," Accessed May 15, 2016, https://snhu-media.snhu.edu/files/course_repository/undergraduate/his/his235/aleksandr_solzhenitsyn_letter_to_the_soviet_leaders_1974.pdf, page 2, para 7. 

     [4] Andrei Sakharov, "Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom," Accessed May 15, 2016, https://snhu-media.snhu.edu/files/course_repository/undergraduate/his/his235/andrei_sakharov_progress_coexistence_and_intellectual_freedom_1974.pdf, page 2, para 1. 

     [5] Ibid, page 1, para 2.