Here's my first discussion post for the term:
Was there a danger that the Bolshevik Revolution would spread from Russia in the period 1917-1920?
Stipulating
up front that hindsight always provides 20/20 vision, I have to conclude that
there was virtually no danger that the Bolshevik Revolution would spread beyond
Russia in the aftermath of World War I. Part of drawing this conclusion of
course is dependent on how comparatively easy revolutions in Berlin, Munich,
Budapest, and Bratislava were put down, but the other part of the issue regards
how well entrenched the ruling elites were in these countries (and others), as
well as how badly the Bolsheviks, in attempting to export revolution, misjudged
the power of nationalism and the forces of reaction.
On the
first point, Charles Maier argues compellingly that Marxist revolution was
contained in concerted efforts by the bourgeoisie to prevent the loss of status
and power. Of the three countries on which Maier focuses his argument, Germany
is the most important since it experienced two Marxist uprising with temporary
success. Part of the success of counter-revolution in Germany was how well
entrenched traditional bases of power, i.e., the military and aristocratic
landowners, still were when the war ended. Maier writes, "The
constitutional system of the Reich and the three-class Prussian voting system,
as well as the continuing dominance of the army and bureaucracy, preserved the
power of the Junkers until 1918 and even beyond."[1] These power bases, as
well the important Catholic constituency and the ascendant industrial
bourgeoisie within the liberal parties, were effective controls on the power of
the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) before the war. With the
collapse of the monarchy, these interests were willing to support the SPD
against the revolutionary left, and this dependence was reciprocated in the
SPD's inability to government without the center.
On the
topic of nationalism, Ivan Berend's analysis is instructive. Beyond the obvious
example of fascism emerging in certain places as an effective immunization
against Marxism, Berend's treatment of postwar ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia
provides an important context in which to read Boris Starkov's account of
Soviet intrigue in the Balkans in the 1920s. Berend writes, "The long
dreamt-of brotherhood of the newly founded states was very quickly found to
have snags."[2] Recounting early separatist movements among, e.g., Slovaks
and Croats, it is unsurprising that the necessary unity through class to render
a Marxist uprising successful was lacking since unity in nationality was so
contentious. Finally, it is worth noting that Kun's revolution in Hungary was
put down by many of the same forces that attempted (but failed) to overthrow
the Bolsheviks. Here, the key differences seem to be the comparative lack of
popularity of Kun's regime and the more favorable territorial advantage held by
the Bolsheviks in the Civil War.
[1]
Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois
Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World
War I (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1975), 34.
[2] Iván T.
Berend, "Alternatives to Class Revolution: Central and Eastern Europe
after the First World War," in Pat Thane, Geoffrey Crossick and Roderick
Floud, eds., The Power of the Past: Essays for
Eric Hobsbawm (New York: Cambridge, UP, 1984), 263.
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