Forging a New World? Peacemaking at Paris

Was peace doomed from the beginning? Or did the ‘economic consequences’ of the peace undermine the achievements of the peacemakers? How valid are the criticisms of Keynes?

After reading the materials for this week, I remain convinced that the key failure of the Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles was economic, i.e., that the terms imposed upon Germany were onerous to the point of nearly guaranteeing its future economic instability and, thus, political instability. However, although far more has made said about the reparations payments Germany was required to make being the core reason why the treaty ultimately failed, it seems more important was the extraction of such a large proportion of Germany's resources, rendering it unable to make these payments. Had it retained more of its resources or had access to them on the market or had it lost its resources but not been subjected to reparations, Germany might have become sufficiently economically and politically stable.

In this regard, I really do find Keynes's arguments persuasive. For one thing, he does not suggest that any type of monetary punishment of Germany would be too onerous. Oh the matter of coal, for example, he writes, "This [annual delivery of coal to France for 10 years] is a reasonable provision if it stood by itself, and one which Germany should be able to fulfil if she were left her other resources to do it with."[1] Elsewhere, he is even more blunt: "There is no question but that Germany lost lose these ore-fields. The only question is how far she is to be allowed facilities for purchasing their produce."[2] He makes his case perhaps no more clear than when he writes, "Yet if these feelings [of victors' justice] and these rights are allowed to prevail, beyond what wisdom would recommend, the reactions on the social and economic life of Central Europe will be far too strong to be confined within their original limits."[3]

Among the cases made against Keynes, Zara Steiner's is perhaps the most vociferous, but I don't find it particularly compelling. First, she claims that Keynes found the reparations clauses "morally unjustified and financially unworkable,"[4] but she cites no source on this point, nor does she stipulate why he saw the terms as unworkable. In directly addressing Keynes's argument, which she considers "pernicious but brilliant,"[5] she does little more than argue that the terms of Versailles were not so bad because the terms Germany dictated to the Soviets at Brest-Litovsk were worse. Her most direct statement, i.e., "Even in the short term, the Versailles treaty did not leave Germany prostrate; on the contrary, Germany industry revived, and some historians believe that stabilization might have come earlier had the political structure been less fractured,"[6] i.e., is also unsourced.

Moreover, it seems to put the cart before the horse to some extent, in placing the fractured political structure of Germany because the cause of the treaty's failure, rather than considering that the cause and effect might have been reversed. In fact, with a broad social democratic government including liberal parties, it is hard to argue that Germany was badly political divided in 1919. The Kapp Putsch was a year off and based at least in part on the ultimate imposition of Versailles. Thus, I don't find Steiner's criticisms valid.

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[1] John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Row, 1920), 86.
[2] Ibid, 98.
[3] Ibid, 94.
[4] Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1918-1933 (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 64.
[5] Ibid, 67.
[6] Ibid, 67-68.

Source Analysis: Paris Peace Conference

Self-determination of peoples was alleged to be a major cornerstone of the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War I and culminated in the Treaty of Versailles, among other treaties. Rather than countries in Central and Eastern Europe consisting of empires, the guiding principle was that of the nation-state, with each nation having its own national territory. However, while this principle seems to have been attended to in the cases of southern Slavs, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, it seems to have been largely ignored in the cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Particularly in the former case, the difference between the peace envisioned in the Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the peace that ultimately arose emphasizes the ultimate victory of the desire to punish the vanquished over the establishment of a just peace. 

The principle of self-determination appears in several places in the Fourteen Points. For instance, in Point IX, Wilson writes, "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."[1] This principle is repeated in Point XI with regard to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, in Point XIII with regard to Poland, and even in Point XII with regard to Turkey, one of the states on the losing side in the war.[2] With regard to Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, the terms are vague or absent entirely. Regarding Austria-Hungary, Point X reads, "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development."[3]

However, whether these peoples include the German-speaking people is not stated. There is no individually numbered point pertaining to Germany, although it is mentioned in both the preamble to the points and the afterword. Some of the statements are conciliatory, e.g., "We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it."[4] However, others clearly finger Germany for the lion's share of the blame for the war, e.g., "The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies."[5]

Unfortunately, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the territorial changes in Central Europe made it clear that the self-determination of peoples would come at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary.[6] While it is understandable that Germany would lose territory that contained a Polish-speaking population, and Austria-Hungary would lose territory peopled by Romanians, Slavs, and Italians, the actual territorial adjustments left a large number of German-speaking people, including those in areas where they were clear majorities, outside the borders of German-speaking states. For instance, areas of what became western Poland still held German-speaking majorities. Even the city of Danzig, which was 90% German-speaking, was removed from German sovereignty, although it was not rewarded to Poland either and instead was given the status of a free city. The most obvious example was the creation of Czechoslovakia, which, while it respected the self-determination of the Czechs and Slovaks, incorporated the German-majority areas of the Sudetenland so that fully 30% of the new country spoke German as its first language. Finally, the rump state of Austria and Germany were forbidden to unite into a single geopolitical unit, again demonstrating the extent to which self-determination was ignored as a principle in application to German-speaking Europeans.

However, the punishment meted out to Germany was not merely territorial. Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles makes clear that Germany would be forced to make substantial reparations. Some of these reparations are wholly justified, e.g., in the case of Belgium, the neutrality of which was overtly violated by Germany in 1914, the Treaty prescribes:

In accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to complete restoration for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to the compensation for damage elsewhere in this Part provided for, as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on such sums.[7]

However, other articles of Part VIII seem more sinister in intent when considered in light of the territorial changes. For instance, Germany lost territory to France in Alsace-Lorraine and lost economic control over the Saar Region; similarly, it was forced to cede territory in Silesia to Poland. On the surface, these cessions might seem moderate, particularly that in Alsace-Lorraine, given Germany's relatively recent acquisition of that territory in the Franco-Prussian War. However, when the reparations portions of the Versailles Treaty are read in light of these cessions, particularly when it is considered that much of Germany's industrial base relied on raw materials from these regions, then terms of the reparations, such as the exportation of coal to the victors,[8] building of ships for the British,[9] etc., appear impossible for Germany to fulfill, as indeed they proved. Clearly, in the struggle between Wilson’s desire for self-determination and French Prime Minister Clemenceau’s desire to punish, the latter prevailed with regard to Germany.[10]

            In conclusion, while the ideal of self-determination was meant to be embodiment in the peace process that ended World War I, the reality that emerged for the losing side was one of punishment. Several new states emerged as a result of the application of the core Wilsonian principle, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland. However, Germany lost significant territory, including German-speaking people, and was stripped of much of its ability to pay the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. As a result, it is little wonder that Germany was both unable to pay reparations and, as time passed, increasing unwilling to honor the Treaty of Versailles at all.

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[1] “8 January, 1918: President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points,” The World War I Primary Document Archive, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.gwpda.org/1918/14points.html

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, afterword, para. 2.

[5] Ibid, preamble, para. 7.

[6] Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present, 6th ed. (New York: Norton, 2008), 159-60.

[7] “Peace Treaty of Versailles, Articles 231-247 and Annexes, Reparations,” The World War I Primary Document Archive, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.gwpda.org/versa/versa7.html

[8] Ibid, Annex V.

[9] Ibid, Annex III.

[10] Gilbert and Large, 161-62.