Self-determination of peoples was
alleged to be a major cornerstone of the Paris Peace Conference that ended
World War I and culminated in the Treaty of Versailles, among other treaties.
Rather than countries in Central and Eastern Europe consisting of empires, the
guiding principle was that of the nation-state, with each nation having its own
national territory. However, while this principle seems to have been attended
to in the cases of southern Slavs, Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, it
seems to have been largely ignored in the cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Particularly in the former case, the difference between the peace envisioned in
the Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the peace that ultimately arose
emphasizes the ultimate victory of the desire to punish the vanquished over the
establishment of a just peace.
The principle of
self-determination appears in several places in the Fourteen Points. For
instance, in Point IX, Wilson writes, "A readjustment of the frontiers of
Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."[1] This
principle is repeated in Point XI with regard to Romania, Serbia, and
Montenegro, in Point XIII with regard to Poland, and even in Point XII with
regard to Turkey, one of the states on the losing side in the war.[2] With regard
to Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, the terms are vague or absent
entirely. Regarding Austria-Hungary, Point X reads, "The peoples of
Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and
assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous
development."[3]
However, whether these peoples
include the German-speaking people is not stated. There is no individually
numbered point pertaining to Germany, although it is mentioned in both the
preamble to the points and the afterword. Some of the statements are
conciliatory, e.g., "We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is
nothing in this program that impairs it."[4]
However, others clearly finger Germany for the lion's share of the blame for
the war, e.g., "The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless
frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the
war, lies with Germany and her allies."[5]
Unfortunately, the terms of the
Treaty of Versailles and the territorial changes in Central Europe made it
clear that the self-determination of peoples would come at the expense of
Germany and Austria-Hungary.[6]
While it is understandable that Germany would lose territory that contained a
Polish-speaking population, and Austria-Hungary would lose territory peopled by
Romanians, Slavs, and Italians, the actual territorial adjustments left a large
number of German-speaking people, including those in areas where they were
clear majorities, outside the borders of German-speaking states. For instance,
areas of what became western Poland still held German-speaking majorities. Even
the city of Danzig, which was 90% German-speaking, was removed from German
sovereignty, although it was not rewarded to Poland either and instead was
given the status of a free city. The most obvious example was the creation of
Czechoslovakia, which, while it respected the self-determination of the Czechs
and Slovaks, incorporated the German-majority areas of the Sudetenland so that
fully 30% of the new country spoke German as its first language. Finally, the
rump state of Austria and Germany were forbidden to unite into a single
geopolitical unit, again demonstrating the extent to which self-determination
was ignored as a principle in application to German-speaking Europeans.
However, the punishment meted out
to Germany was not merely territorial. Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles
makes clear that Germany would be forced to make substantial reparations. Some
of these reparations are wholly justified, e.g., in the case of Belgium, the
neutrality of which was overtly violated by Germany in 1914, the Treaty
prescribes:
In
accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to complete restoration
for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to the compensation for damage
elsewhere in this Part provided for, as a consequence of the violation of the
Treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed
from the Allied and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together
with interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on such sums.[7]
However, other articles of Part
VIII seem more sinister in intent when considered in light of the territorial
changes. For instance, Germany lost territory to France in Alsace-Lorraine and
lost economic control over the Saar Region; similarly, it was forced to cede
territory in Silesia to Poland. On the surface, these cessions might seem
moderate, particularly that in Alsace-Lorraine, given Germany's relatively
recent acquisition of that territory in the Franco-Prussian War. However, when
the reparations portions of the Versailles Treaty are read in light of these
cessions, particularly when it is considered that much of Germany's industrial
base relied on raw materials from these regions, then terms of the reparations,
such as the exportation of coal to the victors,[8]
building of ships for the British,[9]
etc., appear impossible for Germany to fulfill, as indeed they proved. Clearly,
in the struggle between Wilson’s desire for self-determination and French Prime
Minister Clemenceau’s desire to punish, the latter prevailed with regard to
Germany.[10]
In
conclusion, while the ideal of self-determination was meant to be embodiment in
the peace process that ended World War I, the reality that emerged for the
losing side was one of punishment. Several new states emerged as a result of
the application of the core Wilsonian principle, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and Poland. However, Germany lost significant territory, including
German-speaking people, and was stripped of much of its ability to pay the
reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. As a result, it is little
wonder that Germany was both unable to pay reparations and, as time passed,
increasing unwilling to honor the Treaty of Versailles at all.
[1] “8 January,
1918: President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points,” The World War I Primary
Document Archive, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.gwpda.org/1918/14points.html
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid, afterword,
para. 2.
[5] Ibid, preamble,
para. 7.
[6] Felix Gilbert
and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present,
6th ed. (New York: Norton, 2008), 159-60.
[7] “Peace Treaty of
Versailles, Articles 231-247 and Annexes, Reparations,” The World War I Primary
Document Archive, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.gwpda.org/versa/versa7.html
[8] Ibid, Annex V.
[9] Ibid, Annex III.
[10] Gilbert and Large, 161-62.
